BLAISE AD HAZOP

RMD-02-004



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RMD Ref No: RMD-02-006

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: HAZOP Sheets

Appendix B: HAZOP Action Sheets

DRAWINGS

All drawings based upon BioConstruct drawing B201903 / A02, dated 15.05.19.

Node Drawings: All Nodes

Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node 4 Node 5 Node 6 Node 7 Node 8 Node 9 Node 10 Node 11 Node 11 Node 12 Node 13 Node 14

Node 12 Node 13 Node 14 Node 15 Node 16 Node 17 Node 18 Node 19 Node 20 Node 21

Node 22 Node 23



1.0 Introduction

An interface HAZOP study was undertaken at BioConstruct's offices at Stockton-on-Tees, Teesside on 3rd June 2019, commencing on 4th June and being completed on 9th July, on the design of the proposed Anaerobic Digestion Facility for Crofthead.

The HAZOP Study Team comprised:

•	Simon Hemingway	 Project Engineer 	 BioConstruct New Energy
•	Paul Foxton	– CDM Advisor	– SRC
•	Charlie Jones	– Apprentice	– SRC
•	Martin Swift	– Engineer	– D&G
•	Gary Marshall	Client's Representative	– SRC
•	Albert Ogundipe	Asset Manager	– SGN
•	Steven Whitlock	 Asset Distribution Manager 	– SGN
•	Shaun Stephenson	 Gas Quality Engineer 	– SGN
•	Russ Harley	Project Manager	– Elster
•	Janice Grant	– HAZOP Scribe	– Scotia Scribe
•	Rónan M. Doyle	 HAZOP Study Leader 	 RMD Consulting Engineer Limited

This report details the findings of the HAZOP Study. The drawings used in the HAZOP study are found in the Drawings Section of this report and are based upon the following P&IDs:

- BioConstruct P&IDs, "B201903 / A02 a", dated 07.06.19;
- Elster P&ID, "MMB-336441.02.BNEF.101.PI", dated 15.04.19;
- Elster P&ID, "MMB-336441.02.BNEF.102.PI", dated 15.04.19;
- Elster P&ID, "MMB-336441.02.LPG.101.PI", dated 15.04.19;
- Pentair P&ID, "195012.01.1.01, Revision 1", dated 25.04.2019; and,
- Flogas P&ID, "2078-1, Revision 1", dated 20.05.19;



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2.0 Methodology

2.1 Introduction

Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) studies are structured and systematic examinations of processes or operations, used to identify and evaluate problems that may represent risks to personnel or equipment, or the operability of the process or operation. The intention of the HAZOP study is to identify risks, their potential causes and consequences, and the preventative or mitigation measures in place. Once these have been identified the HAZOP Team considers whether the preventative and mitigation measures are sufficient, or whether additional measures are required. If additional measures are believed to be required, the HAZOP Team identifies options available and allocates the consideration of those measures to team members.

2.2 Parameters and Guide Words

The HAZOP is undertaken by a multidisciplinary team led by a HAZOP Study Leader with the aid of a Scribe to note the discussions undertaken. The HAZOP Team considers the operation or process through the systematic study of the Process and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) of the process. The process is divided in to small sections, known as nodes, each node having a design intention.

The node is then studied using Guide Words and Parameters.

The Guide Words used during the HAZOP study were:

Table 2-1
Guide Words

Guide Word	Meaning
No	Complete negation of the design intent
High / More	Quantitative increase
Low / Less	Quantitative decrease
As Well As	Qualitative modification / increase
Part Of	Qualitative modification / decrease
Reverse	Logical opposite of the design intent
Other Than	Complete substitution

The parameters used during the HAZOP study were:

Table 2-1 Parameters

Parameter					
Flow					
Pressure					
Temperature					
Level					
Reaction					
Stirring					
Viscosity					
Mixing					



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Parameter					
Start-up					
Shut-down					
Maintenance					
Composition					
Sequence					

The Guide Words and Parameters are combined to form a deviation which the team will consider. Examples combinations are identified in Table 2-3.

Table 2-3 Deviations

Guide Word	Parameter	Deviation
No	Flow	No Flow
More	Flow	More Flow
Less	Flow	Less Flow
High	Temperature	High Temperature
Low	Temperature	Low Temperature
Reverse	Flow	Reverse Flow
More	Stirring	More Stirring

2.3 HAZOP Study Team

The HAZOP Study Team comprised

Table 2-4
HAZOP Study Team

Team Member	Role	Company
Simon Hemingway	Project Engineer	BioConstruct New Energy
Martin Swift	Engineer	D&G
Paul Foxton	CDM Advisor	SRC
Charlie Jones	Apprentice	SRC
Gary Marshall	Client's Representative	SRC
Albert Ogundipe	Asset Manager	SGN
Steven Whitlock	Asset Distribution Manager	SGN
Shaun Stephenson	Gas Quality Engineer	SGN
Russ Harley	Project Manager	Elster
Janice Grant	HAZOP Scribe	Scotia Scribe
Rónan M Doyle	HAZOP Study Leader	RMD Consulting Engineer Ltd



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2.4 Nodes Considered

The nodes considered during the HAZOP of the week of 3rd June 2019 were:

- Node 1 The GUU;
- Node 2 The GEU;
- Node 3 The Reject System; and
- Node 4 The Propane System.

The HAZOP Study Sheets can be found in Appendix A, and the HAZOP Action Sheets can be found in Appendix B.



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3.0 Closure

The HAZOP findings are presented in the HAZOP recording sheets presented in Appendix A, and the actions recorded are identified in Appendix B. There were no findings that would present any significant safety or operability hazards within the design, as reviewed through the HAZOP.

This document considered the design as presented over the week of 3rd June. If there are any significant changes to the design, those changes should undergo hazard assessment, and be considered under a change management process.



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APPENDIX A -

HAZOP Sheets



Project:	RMD-02-006 Blaise Interface HAZOP	Date of meeting	09/07/2019
Item:		Members present	Simon Hemmingway, Paul Foxton, Charlie Jones, Martin Swift, Gary Marshall, Albert Ogundipe, Steven Whitlock, Shaun Stephenson, Russ Harley, Janice Grant, Rónan Doyle
Notes:			
Drawing Ref:	B201903 / A02 a, MMB-336441.02.BNEF.101.PI, 195012.01.1.01		
Node:	1		
Title	The GUU		
Desc:	The provision of Biogas to the Gas upgrade Unit and biomethane to the Grid Entry Unit		

ID/N -	Deviation Deviation		N.	Paraikla Causas	2	Cofemando	Ma	Astions Demoiss	Action Allocated to
ID/No.	Guide word	Parameter	No.	Possible Causes	Consequence	Safeguards	No.	Actions Required	Action Allocated to
1.1	No	Flow	1.1.1	No flow into the BUU Poor biogas quality	Poor gas quality to Pentair unit potential for out of spec biomethane failure of GSMR specifications reject from GEU	Biogas analysis within AD facility will identify out of spec biogas feed to Pentair and will prevent feed to BUU - Pentair take BioConstruct signals and determine biogas quality Methane measurement within Pentair unit to ensure correct quality feed to GEU			
			1.1.2	Manual valve GT5G Y300 closed when should be open normally open operator / commissioning / maintenance error	Valve shut prior to start-up of Pentair unit results in low flow signal and inability to start the Pentair unit Valve closed during operation potential catastrophic failure of compressors increased fire and explosion risk	Operator training Pre-commissioning and post maintenance checks Secure site Low pressure alarm shuts down Pentair unit compressors Overpressure relief within Pentair unit through PSV-2802-01 (14barg)			
1.2	No	Flow	1.2.1	No flow to GEU	No flow of biomethane to the GEU - no injection to grid inefficient operation Potential overpressure of BUU, increased fire and explosion risk	Operator training Pre-commissioning and post maintenance checks Overpressure relief within the BUU Alarm signals from the BUU ROV will stay open Ability to interrogate the Pentair through the BioConstruct dial in system			
			1.2.2	Manual valve GT6G Y300 closed when should be open normally open operator / maintenance / commissioning error					
1.3	General Action						1.3.2.1	Ensure design of pipework between BUU and GUU is corrects	DNG, Elster & BioConstruct
1.4	More	Pressure	1.4.1	High inlet pressure from BUU	Potential overpressure of GUU - increased fire and explosion risk	GEU pipework and system designed to 16 bar pressure Interconnecting pipework between BEU and GEU designed to 16 bar pressure Overpressure relief in BUU 14bar Pressure regulator PCV-2904-01 regulates inlet pressure to GEU to approximately 7.5 - 8.5barg			
1.5	No	Signal	1.5.1	Loss of signal from BUU to GEU	Loss of signal will result in shutdown of GEU if operational if not operational GEU sits in readiness	Reciprocal watch dog on signals which will alarm on loss of signal Shutdown of GEU will result in controlled shutdown of BEU			
			1.5.2	Loss of signal from GEU to BUU	Loss of signal will result in controlled shutdown of BEU resulting in controlled shutdown of GEU	Reciprocal watch dog on signals which will alarm on loss of signal Shutdown of BEU will result in controlled shutdown of GEU			



Project:	RMD-02-006 Blaise Interface HAZOP	Date of meeting	09/07/2019
Item:		Members present	Simon Hemmingway, Paul Foxton, Charlie Jones, Martin Swift, Gary Marshall, Albert Ogundipe, Steven Whitlock, Shaun Stephenson, Russ Harley, Janice Grant, Rónan Doyle
Notes:			
Drawing Ref:	B201903 / A02 a, MMB-336441.02.BNEF.101.PI, MMB-336441.02.BNEF.102.PI		
Node:	2		
Title	The GEU		
Desc:	The provision of biomethane from the Grid Entry Unit to the Grid		

ID/No.	D/No Deviation		No.	No	No	No	Possible Causes	Conceguence	Safaguarda	No.	Actions Required	Action Allocated to
ID/NO.	Guide word	Parameter	NO.	Possible Causes	Consequence	Safeguards	NO.	Actions Required	Action Allocated to			
2.1	No	Flow	2.1.1	Poor biomethane quality	The Elster unit goes to reject to flare - 20 minute reject to allow gas quality to improve, inefficient operation	Gas analysis in the AD facility to monitor gas quality fed to BUU BUU CH4 measurement to ensure correct purity fed to Elster unit Realtime monitoring of biomethane quality within Elster unit allows adjustment of propane to maintain CV OFGEM analyser on outlet measures full biomethane quality						
			2.1.2	The ROV is shut	The Elster unit will reject to flare After 20 minutes a "not available" signal sent to Elster to Pentair - Pentair unit shuts down and bleeds back to the AD biogas line to relieve pressure - approximately 2 hours gas storage buffer within the AD facility at normal operation Potential flaring of biogas	Poor gas quality (see 2.1.1) Loss of communications (see 2.1.3)						
			2.1.3	Loss of communications	Closure of ROV and reject to flare (see 2.1.1 & 2.1.2)	2 methods of communication, satellite link and backup telephone line - 4 minute lag to allow either satellite link to be restored or telephone line communication to synchronise						
			2.1.4	Interference damage on grid	 Inability to inject to grid requiring divert to flare If catastrophic damage to gas main ROV will operate and reject to flare from Elster unit 	A valve chamber available to SGN engineers to allow fitting of a valve rider governor which can be fitted to facilitate pressure reduction						
			2.1.5	Loss of propane	Biomethane quality unable to meet CV target - unable to inject to grid (see 2.1.1) See Node 4	• See Node 4 • See 2.1.1						
			2.1.6	High inject differential pressure compared with grid pressure	Unlikely scenario							
			2.1.7	No flow from BUU	Inability to inject to grid (see Node 1)	• See Node 1						
			2.1.8	Power failure (including lightning strike)	Unable to inject gas to grid thus reject to flare approximately 2 hours gas storage space in normal operation before requirement to reduce pressure through flaring	Battery pack capable of maintaining 8 hours instrument life for SGN RTU (remote telemetry unit) Itelemetry unit) Itelemetry pack for controlled shutdown of grid entry unit Battery pack for Coms and instrumentation within AD facility Automatic start-up of backup generator on AD facility to maintain critical plant and equipment including the flare Lightning risk assessment (see DSEAR assessment)						



ID/No	/No Deviation		No.	Possible Causes	C	Cofeminado	No.	Actions Described	Astion Allocated to
ID/No.	Guide word	Parameter	NO.	Possible Causes	Consequence	Safeguards	NO.	Actions Required	Action Allocated to
2.1	No	Flow	2.1.9	Failure of LGT (odour unit)	Potential to inject un-odorised gas into network - not GSMR compliant	Low level alarm on the odorant, alerts operator to refill - operator decants to onboard reserve tank and new bottle ordered for delivery(approximately 7-10 days minimum capacity within reserve tank) Flow meter measures odorant injection Measure odorant injection pump strokes and calculate flow - if pump strokes or flow measurement inconsistent then alarm and send to divert			
			2.1.10	Biomethane temperature outside specified range in NEA (0-20 degrees maximum) On start-up high or low ambient temperature Failure of Pentair chiller	Inability to inject to grid - divert to flare Potential damage to gas main	Temperature measurement within Elster unit TT1023 ensures high temperature or low temperature biomethane is diverted Temperature measurement from TT1140 ensures temperature to grid within specification and diverts when outwith specification In minute period granted by SGN on startup to allow temperature to fall within range			
			2.1.11	Compressed air failure	Inability to operate valves - potential unsafe scenarios, increased fire and explosion risk	Compressor reservoir allows sufficient capacity to shutdown plant in a controlled manor Valve to reject fails open ROV and gas to grid valve fail closed Propane valve fails closed Low pressure switch in Pentair compressor alarms Potential to connect to BioConstruct compressed air system if required			



Project:	RMD-02-006 Blaise Interface HAZOP	Date of meeting	09/07/2019
Item:		Members present	Simon Hemmingway, Paul Foxton, Charlie Jones, Martin Swift, Gary Marshall, Albert Ogundipe, Steven Whitlock, Shaun Stephenson, Russ Harley, Janice Grant, Rónan Doyle
Notes:	RMD to include flare from AD facility		
Drawing Ref:	B201903 / A02 a, MMB-336441.02.BNEF.101.PI		
Node:	3		
Title	Reject System		
Desc:	The reject of biomethane from the GEU to the flare and flaring from the AD facility		

ID/No	Devi	iation	Na	Beesible Course	6	Cafamuanda	N.	Actions Demoised	Astion Allocated to
ID/No.	Guide word	Parameter	No.	Possible Causes	Consequence	Safeguards	No.	Actions Required	Action Allocated to
3.1	As Well As	Flow	3.1.1	Requirement to flare from both GEU reject as well as biogas plant	Inability to burn biomethane and biogas at same time - potential to over-pressurise the biogas system, increased fire and explosion risk, overpressure potential within GEU and BUU increased fire and explosion risk				
3.2	General Action						3.2.1.1	Remove pressure regulating valve GV6G Y301 due to Elster unit having PRV 1074	BioConstruct
3.3	General Action						3.3.1.1	To install a motorised valve in the reject line to fermenter 2	BioConstruct
3.4	General Action						3.4.1.1	Prioritise reject to flare over reject to fermenter 2 from GEU and prioritise reject from GEU over flaring from the AD plant	BioConstruct
3.5	More	Pressure	3.5.1	Motorised valve PBV2 / PBV0 not opening quick enough	Potential to over-pressurise GEU increased fire and explosion risk	Slamshut valve SSV3003 and integral safety shutoff within regular valve PRV1074 protects pipeline			
3.6	No	Flow	3.6.1	No flow of biomethane to flare - failure of internal motorised valves within flare or manual valve GV1G Y301 (operator / maintenance / commissioning error)	Inability to flare biomethane potential increased fire and explosion risk	Operator training Regular maintenance and inspection Pre-commissioning and post maintenance checks	3.6.1.1	On inability to flare biomethane for any reason ensure motorised valve to be installed on reject to fermenter 2 will open rapidly	BioConstruct
3.7	General Action						3.7.1.1	If the flare does not ignite and "goes to dump" ensure that reject to fermenter 2 can occur rapidly	BioConstruct
3.8	More	Composition	3.8.1	Reject of enriched biomethane to fermenter 2	Enriched biogas within biogas system - potential for CHP failure Potential for over enriched feed to the Pentair unit - constant reject Potential over enriched biogas to flare - potential damage to flare or inability to flare	Maximum time for reject before shut down signal occurs is 20 minutes Biogas quality (methane concentration) agreed for feed to Pentair unit			



Project:	RMD-02-006 Blaise Interface HAZOP	Date of meeting	09/07/2019
Item:		Members present	Simon Hemmingway, Paul Foxton, Charlie Jones, Martin Swift, Gary Marshall, Albert Ogundipe, Steven Whitlock, Shaun Stephenson, Russ Harley, Janice Grant, Rónan Doyle
Notes:			
Drawing Ref:	B201903 / A02 a, 2078-1, MMB-336441.02.LPG.101.PI		
Node:	4		
Title	The propane system		
Desc:	The provision of propane to the GEU		

ID/No.	Deviation		No.	Possible Causes	Canaguana	Safamuarda	No.	Actions Descrived	Action Allocated to
ID/NO.	Guide word	Parameter	NO.	Possible Gauses	Consequence	Safeguards	NO.	Actions Required	Action Allocated to
4.1	General Action						4.1.0.1	Install manual isolation valve on propane inlet to GEU	Flogas
4.2	More	Flow	4.2.1	Failure of spillback valve LV3008	Increase in pressure in propane line - increased fire and explosion risk	Overpressure relief within Flogas system and GEU			
4.3	No	Flow	4.3.1	Failure of duty propane pump electrical mechanical failure	Unable to propanate the biomethane resulting in reject	Automatic start-up of standby pump on reduced pressure - on pump failure due to electrical failure there is a pump error signal. On low pressure if low pressure continues once standby pump operational both pumps will be shut-down an alarm signal is raised Regular maintenance and inspection Operator training			
			4.3.2	Manual valve LV 3014 /3017 closed when should be open normally open operator / commissioning / maintenance error	Unable to propanate the biomethane resulting in reject	Operator training Pre-commissioning and post maintenance checks Propane storage within separate secured compound			
4.4	Less	Temperature	4.4.1	Vaporiser malfunction electrical failure	Inability to blend propane - failure to meet GSMR quality standards, biomethane to reject	 Regular maintenance and inspection Alarms on the electrical breaker Low temperature alarm on water and propane exit Automatic valves 1 & 3 are closed until correct temperature achieved 			
4.5	No	Flow	4.5.1	Tank runs dry	Inability to blend propane - failure to meet GSMR quality standards, biomethane to reject	Low flow alarm will shut-down GEU Propane supply contract ensuring weekly top up of tanks Level indication and telemetry on propane tanks will automatically trigger a delivery at 1/3 volume			
			4.5.2	Fractured propane line external to the GEU	Loss of containment of propane and increased fire and explosion risk	Low pressure alarm within GEU stops propane pumps			
			4.5.3	Propane line fracture within GEU	Loss of containment of propane and increased fire and explosion risk	Propane detection within GEU raises alarm GEU rated ATEX zone 1			
4.6	General Action						4.6.3.1	Flogas to provide SRCPM with fire precaution requirements	Flogas



APPENDIX B -

HAZOP Action Sheets



		1	
Project:	RMD-02-006 Blaise Interface HAZOP	Date of meeting	09/07/2019
Item:		Members present	Simon Hemmingway, Paul Foxton, Charlie Jones, Martin Swift, Gary Marshall, Albert Ogundipe, Steven Whitlock, Shaun Stephenson, Russ Harley, Janice Grant, Rónan Doyle
Notes:			
Drawing Ref:	B201903 / A02 a, MMB-336441.02.BNEF.101.PI, 195012.01.1.01		
Node:	1		
Title	The GUU		
Desc:	The provision of Biogas to the Gas upgrade Unit and biomethane to the Grid	Entry Unit	

ID/No.	Deviation	No.	Possible Causes	Consequence	Safeguards	No.	Actions Required	Action Allocated to	Action Complete	Validation
1.3	General Action					1.3.2.1	Ensure design of pipework between BUU and GUU is corrects	DNG, Elster & BioConstruct		

Project:	RMD-02-006 Blaise Interface HAZOP	Date of meeting	09/07/2019
Item:		Members present	Simon Hemmingway, Paul Foxton, Charlie Jones, Martin Swift, Gary Marshall, Albert Ogundipe, Steven Whitlock, Shaun Stephenson, Russ Harley, Janice Grant, Rónan Doyle
Notes:	No actions identified in this node		
Drawing Ref:	B201903 / A02 a, MMB-336441.02.BNEF.101.PI, MMB-336441.02.BNEF.102.PI		
Node:	2		
Title	The GEU		
Desc:	The provision of biomethane from the Grid Entry Unit to the Grid		



		_	
Project:	RMD-02-006 Blaise Interface HAZOP	Date of meeting	09/07/2019
Item:		Members present	Simon Hemmingway, Paul Foxton, Charlie Jones, Martin Swift, Gary Marshall, Albert Ogundipe, Steven Whitlock, Shaun Stephenson, Russ Harley, Janice Grant, Rónan Doyle
Notes:	RMD to include flare from AD facility		
Drawing Ref:	B201903 / A02 a, MMB-336441.02.BNEF.101.PI		
Node:	3		
Title	Reject System		
Desc:	The reject of biomethane from the GEU to the flare and flaring from the AD fa	acility	

ID/No.	Deviation	No.	Possible Causes	Consequence	Safeguards	No.	Actions Required	Action Allocated to	Action Complete	Validation
3.2	General Action					3.2.1.1	Remove pressure regulating valve GV6G Y301 due to Elster unit having PRV 1074	BioConstruct		
3.3	General Action					3.3.1.1	To install a motorised valve in the reject line to fermenter 2	BioConstruct		
3.4	General Action					3.4.1.1	Prioritise reject to flare over reject to fermenter 2 from GEU and prioritise reject from GEU over flaring from the AD plant	BioConstruct		
3.6	No Flow	3.6.1	No flow of biomethane to flare - failure of internal motorised valves within flare or manual valve GV1G Y301 (operator / maintenance / commissioning error)	Inability to flare biomethane potential increased fire and explosion risk	Operator training Regular maintenance and inspection Pre-commissioning and post maintenance checks	3.6.1.1	On inability to flare biomethane for any reason ensure motorised valve to be installed on reject to fermenter 2 will open rapidly	BioConstruct		
3.7	General Action					3.7.1.1	If the flare does not ignite and "goes to dump" ensure that reject to fermenter 2 can occur rapidly	BioConstruct		

Project:	RMD-02-006 Blaise Interface HAZOP	Date of meeting	09/07/2019
Item:		Members present	Simon Hemmingway, Paul Foxton, Charlie Jones, Martin Swift, Gary Marshall, Albert Ogundipe, Steven Whitlock, Shaun Stephenson, Russ Harley, Janice Grant, Rónan Doyle
Notes:			
Drawing Ref:	B201903 / A02 a, 2078-1, MMB-336441.02.LPG.101.PI		
Node:	4		
Title	The propane system		
Desc:	The provision of propane to the GEU		


ID/No.	Deviation	No.	Possible Causes	Consequence	Safeguards	No.	Actions Required	Action Allocated to	Action Complete	Validation
4.1	General Action					4.1.0.1	Install manual isolation valve on propane inlet to GEU			
4.6	General Action					4.6.3.1	Flogas to provide SRCPM with fire precaution requirements	Flogas		




DRAWINGS


DRAWINGS














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201903 / A02 a	%	DIN AC	N AC			
	•	date:	name:			
esigned:		15.05.1	9 W.Seltmann			
nanged:						
t	kind of change:	date:	name:			
heat pipe changed		07.06.	9 W.Seltmann			






All valves capped!



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		date:	name:
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heat pipe changed	heat pipe changed		




UNLESS OTHERWISE STATED THIS DRAWING IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY

BNEF OPERATING PA		
	MINIMUM	MAXIMUM
INLET PRESSURE	7.5 Barg	9.0 Barg
OUTLET PRESSURE	1.4 Barg	6.9 Barg
FLOW RATE	150 SM³/Hr	1100 SM ³ /Hr
INLET TEMPERATURE	10°C	15°C
OUTLET TEMPERATURE	1°C	20°C

PRESSURE LIMITS	
ITEM	PRESSURE
MIP(u)	16 BARG
MOP(u)	9.0 BARG
MIP(d)	8.4 BARG
MOP(d)	7.0 BARG

	SET	PRESSURES	
ITEM	TAG NUMBER	SET POINT	ACCURACY CLASS
SSV	SSV1037	8.2 BARG	2.5%
RELIEF	RV1048	7.8 BARG	5%
MONITOR	AFV1039	7.5 BARG	5%
ACTIVE	AFV1040	7.0 BARG	5%










7 6 5		TITLE BLAISE BNEF PRESSURE REDUCTION & METERING SKID P&ID DRAWING	.	Elster Instromet - Elster Metering Ltd Mutual House Leicester Road Melton Mowbray Leicestershire. LE13 0DB United Kinadom
3		ELSTER STANDARD DESIGN REF: N/A	elster	Tel: +44 (0) 1664 567797 Fax: +44 (0) 1664 504199
2		CLIENT ORDER REF: BLAISE FARM QUARRY	Instromet	Elsteruksales.hps@honeywell.com
1		CLIENT: BLAISE BIOGAS LTD		NTS @ A3 SHEET 1 OF 1
0 JMC 15 04.19 AS 15.04.19 F				1
REV DRAWN DATE CHKD DATE	APPD DATE MODIFICATION	TOLERANCE: N/A	Project Doc Ref: MMB-336441.02.	BNEF.102.PI REV

All valves capped!







project-nr. / plan-nr.:	project-nr. / plan-nr.: scale: plan				
201903 / A02 a			AC		
		date:	name:		
designed:		15,05,19	W.Seltmann		
changed:					
nt:	kind of change:				
heat pipe changed	heat pipe changed				





All valves capped!





filename:						
P&I-diagram_Blaise Farm_WS_190626.dwg						
project-nr. / plan-nr.: scale: plan:						
B201903 / A02 a % DIN /						
		1		date:	name:	
designed:				15,05,19	W.Seltmann	
char	rged:					
nr.	r. kind of change:			date:	name:	
a	heat pipe changed			07.06.19	W.Seltmann	
					·	
				_	_	





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