Appendix B

Unexploded Ordnance risk assessment

Detailed
Unexploded Ordnance (UXO)
Risk Assessment

Project Name	Thorney Lane, Iver
Client	Concept Engineering Consultants Ltd
Site Address	Thorney Lane, Iver, SL0 9HE
Report Reference	DA20371-00
Date	23rd July 2024
Author	JBM
Quality Assurance	PB
Final Check	ERG

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1ST LINE DEFENCE

Executive Summary

Site Location and Description

The site is located in Iver, southern Buckinghamshire. It is bound to the north by the Slough Arm of the Grand Union Canal, to the south by railway lines, and to the east and west by undeveloped land. Recent aerial imagery indicates that the site comprises the premises of Thorney Business Park and adjacent areas of undeveloped land.

The site is approximately centred on the OS grid reference: **TQ 03106 80060**.

Proposed Works

The proposed development on site is understood to include the development of a data centre, with data storage warehouses, security facilities, access roads, parking, substation and associated infrastructure.

This development will be facilitated through various works, including 10 cable percussion boreholes drilled to depths of between 15m-25m bgl, eight dynamic sampler boreholes to depths of up to 5m bgl, and various ground testing and monitoring procedures.

Geology and Bomb Penetration Depth

The British Geological Survey (BGS) map shows the site to be underlain by the London Clay Formation – sedimentary bedrock comprising clay, silt and sand between 56 and 47.8 million years ago during the Palaeogene period. Superficial deposits comprise the Lynch Hill Gravel Member - sand and gravel formed between 362 and 126 thousand years ago during the Quaternary period.

Site-specific geotechnical information was not available to 1st Line Defence at the time of the production of this report. An assessment of maximum bomb penetration depth can be made once such data becomes available, or by a UXO specialist during on-site support.

It should be noted that the maximum depth that a bomb could reach may vary across a site and will be largely dependent on the specific underlying geological strata and its density.

UXO Risk Assessment

1st Line Defence has assessed that there is an overall **Medium Risk** from German and anti-aircraft unexploded ordnance at the site of proposed works. There is an assessed **Low Risk** from Allied unexploded ordnance.

The Risk from German Air-Delivered UXO

- During WWII, the site was located within the Rural District of Eton, which sustained an overall low density of bombing, as represented by bomb density data figure, see Section 11.3. This district was not a priority target for the Luftwaffe, although targets of significance were identified in the site's local area, including Langley Airfield approximately 930m south-west of the site – photography of which is presented in **Annex H**. Langley Airfield was home to Hawker's main fighter assembly plant, and was attacked on several occasions. Allied military features in the site's proximity include a searchlight battery and barrage balloon site, which would have also presented viable targets.
- Across the sources consulted, multiple bombing incidents are recorded within or in close proximity to the site boundary, which are illustrated in a German Incidents Overlay in **Annex P**. These include HE bombs and IBs which fell on either side of the railway near Iver Signal Box, which includes the south-eastern section of the site, and HE bombs, oil bombs and IBs in the vicinity of the Britannia Cable Works, which bordered the site to the north-east. Multiple HE bombs are also recorded immediately south of the site boundary.
- WWII-era and post-war aerial photography of the site was available for consultation. Although the ground disturbances across the site as a result of quarrying preclude a definitive assessment of potential bomb damage, several circular indentations in the ground on site can be recognised, potentially indicating bomb craters.
- As a significant portion of the site comprised quarried ground, as well as an adjacent forest, ground conditions across the site are considered to have been largely unconducive to the easy detection of UXO. A UXB entry hole could be as small as 20cm in diameter (much smaller for 1kg incendiary bombs, which were recorded in the general area), and therefore easily obscured in such conditions.
- Although some level of wartime access is expected in association with quarrying works on site, levels of monitor and observation – particularly regarding post-raid inspections seeking out any evidence of UXO – are not anticipated to have been particularly high across areas of the site already quarried, or covered by dense vegetation.

- In summary, multiple bombing incidents are recorded within or in close proximity to the site boundary, which are illustrated in a German Incidents Overlay in **Annex P**. These include HE bombs and IBs which fell on either side of the railway adjacent to the site, and HE bombs, oil bombs and IBs in the vicinity of the Britannia Cable Works, which bordered the site to the north-east. As a significant portion of the site comprised quarried and wooded ground, ground conditions and access levels across the site are considered to have been largely unconducive to the detection of UXO. Overall, the site has been assessed at a precautionary **Medium Risk** of German UXO contamination. Proactive on-site Risk Mitigation measures are therefore recommended. However, it should be noted that proactive support is not deemed necessary for any works which are planned within the level of post-war fill on site – only where works are to exceed this and affect WWII-ground level – as it is relatively unlikely that large items of UXO such as HE bombs were introduced onto the site through backfill.

The Risk from Allied UXO

- Online sources and WWII-era photography indicate that the site was adjacent to a searchlight battery to the north, and a barrage balloon site to the south, part of the defensive network protecting Langley Airfield. However, no evidence to suggest that the site was directly affected by military activity could be identified. the site has therefore been assessed as holding an overall **Low Risk** of Allied UXO
- The closest HAA battery was located approximately 800m east of the site, in the vicinity of Iver. Despite this distance the maximum effective range of an AA projectile can be up to 15km. The conditions in which HAA or LAA projectiles may have fallen unnoticed within the site boundary are however analogous to those regarding air delivered ordnance.

Post-WWII Redevelopment

- Comparison of WWII-era and recent aerial imagery indicates that the central portion of the site was previously occupied by a quarry, which has since been filled. Post-WWII OS mapping indicates that the western portion of the site was previously occupied by a concrete works and engineering works, which have since been cleared. In the present day, most of the site is occupied by Thorney Business Park, also a post-war development.
- The risk of UXO remaining is considered to be mitigated at the location of and down to the depth of any post-war redevelopment on site. For example, the risk from deep buried UXO will only have been mitigated within the volumes of any post-war pile foundations or deep excavations for basement levels. The risk will however remain within virgin geology below and amongst these post-war works, down to the maximum bomb penetration depth.

Recommended Risk Mitigation Measures

The following risk mitigation measures are recommended to support the proposed works at the Thorney Lane, Iver site:

Activity	Recommended Risk Mitigation Measure
All Works	• UXO Risk Management Plan • Site Specific UXO Awareness Briefings to all personnel conducting intrusive works.
Open Excavations (trial pits, service pits, bulk excavations, strip foundations etc.)	• UXO Specialist On-site Support
Boreholes and Piled Foundations	• Intrusive Magnetometer Survey of all borehole and pile locations/clusters down to maximum bomb penetration depth.

Note – proactive on-site UXO support/survey should not be necessary for any works taking place at the location of and down to the depths of significantly worked post-war made ground/post-war fill.

Glossary

Abbreviation	Definition
AA	Anti-Aircraft
AFS	Auxiliary Fire Service
AP	Anti-Personnel
ARP	Air Raid Precautions
DA	Delay-action
EOC	Explosive Ordnance Clearance
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
FP	Fire Pot
GM	G Mine (Parachute mine)
HAA	Heavy Anti-Aircraft
HE	High Explosive
IB	Incendiary Bomb
JSEODOC	Joint Services Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operation Centre
LAA	Light Anti-Aircraft
LCC	London County Council
LRRB	Long Range Rocket Bomb (V-2)
LSA	Land Service Ammunition
NFF	National Filling Factory
OB	Oil Bomb
PAC	Pilotless Aircraft (V-1)
PB	Phosphorous Bomb
PM	Parachute Mine
POW	Prisoner Of War
RAF	Royal Air Force
RCAF	Royal Canadian Air Force
RFC	Royal Flying Corps
RNAS	Royal Naval Air Service
ROF	Royal Ordnance Factory
SA	Small Arms
SAA	Small Arms Ammunition
SD2	Anti-personnel "Butterfly Bomb"
SIP	Self-Igniting Phosphorous
U/C	Unclassified bomb
UP	Unrotated Projectile (rocket)
USAAF	United States Army Air Force
UX	Unexploded
UXAA	Unexploded Anti-Aircraft
UXB	Unexploded Bomb
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
V-1	Flying Bomb (Doodlebug)
V-2	Long Range Rocket
WAAF	Women's Auxiliary Air Force
X	Exploded

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1st Line Defence Limited®
Detailed Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Risk Assessment

Site: Thorney Lane, Iver
Client: Concept Engineering Consultants Ltd

1. Introduction

1.1. Background

1st Line Defence has been commissioned by Concept Engineering Consultants Ltd to conduct a Detailed Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Risk Assessment for the works proposed at Thorney Lane, Iver

Buried UXO can present a significant risk to construction works and development projects. The discovery of a suspect device during works can cause considerable disruption to operations as well as cause unwanted delays and expense.

UXO in the UK can originate from three principal sources:

1. Munitions resulting from wartime activities including German bombing in WWI and WWII, long range shelling, and defensive activities.
2. Munitions deposited as a result of military training and exercises.
3. Munitions lost, burnt, buried or otherwise discarded either deliberately, accidentally, or ineffectively.

This report will assess the potential factors that may contribute to the risk of UXO contamination. If an elevated risk is identified at the site, this report will recommend appropriate mitigation measures, in order to reduce the risk to as low as is reasonably practicable. Detailed analysis and evidence will be provided to ensure an understanding of the basis for the assessed risk level and any recommendations.

This report complies with the guidelines outlined in CIRIA C681, 'Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) A Guide for the Construction Industry.'

2. Method Statement

2.1. Report Objectives

The aim of this report is to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the potential risk from UXO at Thorney Lane, Iver. The report will also recommend appropriate site and work-specific risk mitigation measures to reduce the risk from explosive ordnance during the envisaged works to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable.

2.2. Risk Assessment Process

1st Line Defence has undertaken a five-step process for assessing the risk of UXO contamination:

1. The likelihood that the site was contaminated with UXO.
2. The likelihood that UXO remains on the site.
3. The likelihood that UXO may be encountered during the proposed works.
4. The likelihood that UXO may be initiated.
5. The consequences of initiating or encountering UXO.

In order to address the above, 1st Line Defence has taken into consideration the following factors:

- Evidence of WWI and WWII German air delivered bombing as well as the legacy of Allied occupation.
- The nature and conditions of the site during WWII.
- The extent of post-war development and UXO clearance operations on site.
- The scope and nature of the proposed works and the maximum assessed bomb penetration depth.
- The nature of ordnance that may have contaminated the proposed site area.

2.3. Sources of Information

Every reasonable effort has been made to ensure that relevant evidence has been consulted and presented in order to produce a thorough and comprehensible report for the client. To achieve this the following, which includes military records and archive material held in the public domain, have been accessed:

- The National Archives and the Centre for Buckinghamshire Studies.
- Historical mapping datasets.
- Historic England National Monuments Record.
- Relevant information supplied by Concept Engineering Consultants Ltd.
- Available material from 33 Engineer Regiment (EOD) Archive (part of 29 Explosive Ordnance and Disposal and Search Group).
- 1st Line Defence's extensive historical archives, library and UXO geo-datasets.
- Open sources such as published books and internet resources.

3. Background to Bombing Records

3.1. General Considerations of Historical Research

This desktop assessment is based largely upon analysis of historical evidence. Every reasonable effort has been made to locate and present significant and pertinent information. 1st Line Defence cannot be held accountable for any changes to the assessed risk level or risk mitigation measures, based on documentation or other data that may come to light at a later date, or which was not available to 1st Line Defence during the production of this report.

It is often problematic and sometimes impossible to verify the completeness and accuracy of WWII-era records. As a consequence, conclusions as to the exact location and nature of a UXO risk can rarely be quantified and are, to a degree, subjective. To counter this, a range of sources have been consulted, presented and analysed. The same methodology is applied to each report during the risk assessment process. 1st Line Defence cannot be held responsible for any inaccuracies or the incompleteness in available historical information.

3.2. German Bombing Records

During WWII, bombing records were generally gathered locally by the police, Air Raid Precaution (ARP) wardens and military personnel. These records typically contained information such as the date, the location, the amount of damage caused and the types of bombs that had fallen during an air raid. This information was made either through direct observation or post-raid surveys. The Ministry of Home Security Bomb Census Organisation would then receive this information, which was plotted onto maps, charts, and tracing sheets by regional technical officers. The collective record set (regional bomb census mapping and locally gathered incidents records) would then be processed and summarised into reports by the Ministry of Home Security Research and Experiments Branch. The latter were tasked with providing the government 'a complete picture of air raid patterns, types of weapons used and damage caused- in particular to strategic services and installations such as railways, shipyards, factories and public utilities.'

The quality, detail and nature of record keeping could vary considerably between provincial towns, boroughs and cities. No two areas identically collated or recorded data. While some local authorities maintained records with a methodical approach, sources in certain areas can be considerably more vague, dispersed, and narrower in scope. In addition, the immediate priority was mostly focused on assisting casualties and minimising damage at the time. As a result, some records can be incomplete and contradictory. Furthermore, many records were even damaged or destroyed in subsequent air raids. Records of raids that took place on sparsely or uninhabited areas were often based upon third party or hearsay information and are therefore not always reliable. Whereas records of attacks on military or strategic targets were often maintained separately and have not always survived.

3.3. Allied Records

During WWII, considerable areas of land were requisitioned by the War Office for the purpose of defence, training, munitions production and the construction of airfields. Records relating to military features vary and some may remain censored. Within urban environments datasets will be consulted detailing the location of munition production as well as wartime air and land defences. In rural locations it may be possible to obtain plans of military establishments, such as airfields, as well as training logs, record books, plans and personal memoirs. As with bombing records, every reasonable effort will be made to access records of, and ascertain any evidence of, military land use. However, there are occasions where such evidence is not available, as records may not be accessible, have been lost/destroyed, or simply were not kept in the first place.

4. UK Regulatory Environment and Guidelines

4.1. General

There is no formal obligation requiring a UXO risk assessment to be undertaken for construction projects in the UK, nor is there any specific legislation stipulating the management or mitigation of UXO risk. However, it is implicit in the legislation outlined below that those responsible for intrusive works (archaeology, site investigation, drilling, piling, excavation etc.) should undertake a comprehensive and robust assessment of the potential risks to employees and that mitigation measures are implemented to address any identified hazards.

4.2. CDM Regulations 2015

The Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2015 (CDM 2015) define the responsibilities of parties involved in the construction of temporary or permanent structures.

The CDM 2015 establishes a duty of care extending from clients, principle designers, and contractors to those working on, or affected by, a project. Those responsible for construction projects may therefore be accountable for the personal or proprietary loss of third parties, if correct health and safety procedure has not been applied.

Although the CDM does not specifically reference UXO, the risk presented by such items is both within the scope and purpose of the legislation. It is therefore implied that there is an obligation for parties to:

- Provide an appropriate assessment of potential UXO risks at the site (or ensure such an assessment is completed by others).
- Put in place appropriate risk mitigation measures if necessary.
- Supply all parties with information relevant to the risks presented by the project.
- Ensure the preparation of a suitably robust emergency response plan.

4.3. The 1974 Health and Safety at Work etc. Act

All employers have a responsibility under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 and the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999, to ensure the health and safety of their employees and third parties, so far as is reasonably practicable and conduct suitable and sufficient risk assessments.

4.4. CIRIA C681

In 2009, the Construction Industry Research and Information Association (CIRIA) produced a guide to the risk posed by UXO to the UK construction industry (CIRIA C681). CIRIA is a neutral, independent and not-for-profit body, linking organisations with common interests and facilitating a range of collaborative activities that help improve the industry.

The publication provides the UK construction industry with a defined process for the management of risks associated with UXO from WWI and WWII air bombardment. It is also broadly applicable to the risks from other forms of UXO that might be encountered. It focuses on construction professionals' needs, particularly if there is a suspected item of UXO on site, and covers issues such as what to expect from a UXO specialist. The guidance also helps clients to fulfil their legal duty under CDM 2015 to provide designers and contractors with project specific health and safety information needed to identify hazards and risks associated with the design and construction work. This report conforms to this CIRIA guidance and to the various recommendations for good practice referenced therein. It is recommended that this document is acquired and studied where possible to allow a better understanding of the background to both the risk assessment process and the UXO issue in the UK in general.

4.5. Additional Legislation

In the event of a casualty resulting from the failure of an employer/client to address the risks relating to UXO, the organisation may be criminally liable under the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007.

5. The Role of Commercial UXO Contractors and The Authorities

5.1. Commercial UXO Specialists

The role of a UXO Specialist (often referred to as UXO Consultant or UXO Contractor) such as 1st Line Defence, is defined in CIRIA C681 as the provision of expert knowledge and guidance to the client on the most appropriate and cost-effective approach to UXO risk management at a site.

The principal role of UXO Specialists is to provide the client with an appropriate assessment of the risk posed by UXO for a specific project, and identify and carry out suitable methodology for the mitigation of any identified risks to reduce them to an acceptable level.

The requirement for a UXO Specialist should ideally be identified in the initial stages of a project, and it is recommended that this occur prior to the start of any detailed design. This will enable the client to budget for expenditure that may be required to address the risks from UXO, and may enable the project team to identify appropriate techniques to eliminate or reduce potential risks through considered design, without the need for UXO specific mitigation measures. The UXO Specialist should have suitable qualifications, levels of competency and insurances.

Please note 1st Line Defence has the capability to provide a complete range of required UXO risk mitigation services, in order to reduce a risk to as low as reasonably practicable. This can involve the provision of both ground investigation, and where appropriate, UXO clearance services.

5.2. The Authorities

The police have a responsibility to co-ordinate the emergency services in the event of an ordnance-related incident at a construction site. Upon inspection they may impose a safety cordon, order an evacuation, and call the military authorities Joint Services Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operation Centre (JSEODOC) to arrange for investigation and/or disposal. Within the Metropolitan Police Operational Area, SO15 EOD will be tasked to any discovery of suspected UXO. The request for Explosive Officer (Expo) support is well understood and practiced by all Metropolitan Boroughs. The requirement for any additional assets will then be coordinated by the Expo if required.

In the absence of a UXO specialist, police officers will usually employ such precautionary safety measures, thereby causing works to cease, and possibly requiring the evacuation of neighbouring businesses and properties.

The priority given to the police request will depend on the EOD teams' judgement of the nature of the UXO risk, the location, people and assets at risk, as well as the availability of resources. The speed of response varies; authorities may respond immediately or in some cases it may take several days for the item of ordnance to be dealt with. Depending on the on-site risk assessment the item of ordnance may be removed from the site and/or destroyed by a controlled explosion.

Following the removal of an item of UXO, the military authorities will only undertake further investigations or clearances in high-risk situations. If there are regular UXO finds on a site the JSEODOC may not treat each occurrence as an emergency and will recommend the construction company puts in place alternative procedures, such as the appointment of a commercial contractor to manage the situation.

6. The Site

6.1. Site Location

The site is located in Iver, southern Buckinghamshire. It is bound to the north by the Slough Arm of the Grand Union Canal, to the south by railway lines, and to the east and west by undeveloped land.

The site is approximately centred on the OS grid reference: **TQ 03106 80060**.

Site location maps are presented in **Annex A**.

6.2. Site Description

Recent aerial imagery indicates that the site comprises the premises of Thorney Business Park and adjacent areas of undeveloped land.

A recent aerial photograph and site plan are presented in **Annex B** and **Annex C** respectively.

7. Scope of the Proposed Works

7.1. General

The proposed development on site is understood to include the development of a data centre, with data storage warehouses, security facilities, access roads, parking, substation and associated infrastructure.

This development will be facilitated through various works, including 10 cable percussion boreholes drilled to depths of between 15m-25m bgl, eight dynamic sampler boreholes to depths of up to 5m bgl, and various ground testing and monitoring procedures.

8. Ground Conditions

8.1. General Geology

The British Geological Survey (BGS) map shows the site to be underlain by the London Clay Formation – sedimentary bedrock comprising clay, silt and sand between 56 and 47.8 million years ago during the Palaeogene Period. Superficial deposits comprise the Lynch Hill Gravel Member - sand and gravel formed between 362 and 126 thousand years ago during the Quaternary Period.

8.2. Site-Specific Geology

Geology data has been provided by Concept Engineering Consultants Ltd, which is presented below.

Site-Specific Geology	
Depth (m)	Description
0m – 2m	Made Ground
2.2m – 22m	Lynch Hill Gravel Member
22m – 24.8m	London Clay Formation

9. Site History

9.1. Introduction

The purpose of this section is to identify the composition of the site pre and post-WWII. It is important to establish the historical use of the site, as this may indicate the site's relation to potential sources of UXO as well as help with determining factors such as the land use, groundcover, likely frequency of access and signs of bomb damage.

9.2. Ordnance Survey Historical Maps

Relevant historical maps were obtained for this report and are presented in **Annex D**. See below for a summary of the site history shown on acquired mapping.

Pre-WWII		
Date	Scale	Description
1932	1:2,500	In this pre-WWII OS mapping, the site is indicated to largely comprise undeveloped land, the western portion of which includes *rough pasture* and *woodland*. A *gravel pit* and adjacent railway lines are indicated in the centre and south of the site. The site is bound to the north by the *Grand Union Canal Slough Branch*, to the south by railway lines including the *Iver Sidings*, and to the east and west by undeveloped land.

Post-WWII		
Date	Scale	Description
1970	1:2,500	In this post-WWII OS mapping, the western portion of the site is indicated to comprise a *Concrete Works* and adjacent *Engineering Works*, connected to which is a *Builder's Yard* in the north-eastern corner; the remainder of the site is largely undeveloped. To the north, multiple structures bordering the site in the pre-WWII OS mapping are now absent. In the south-east, additional residential properties are visible in the vicinity of *Richings Park*.

10. Introduction to German Air Delivered Ordnance

10.1. General

During WWI and WWII, the UK was subjected to bombing which often resulted in extensive damage to city centres, docks, rail infrastructure and industrial areas. The poor accuracy of WWII targeting technology and the nature of bombing techniques often resulted in neighbouring areas to targets sustaining collateral damage.

In addition to raids which concentrated on specific targets, indiscriminate bombing of large areas also took place. This occurred most prominently in the London 'Blitz', though affected many other towns and cities. As discussed in the following sections, a proportion of the bombs dropped on the UK did not detonate as designed. Although extensive efforts were made to locate and deal with these UXBs at the time, many still remain buried and can present a potential risk to construction projects.

The main focus of research for this section of the report will concern German air delivered ordnance dropped during WWII, although WWI bombing will also be considered.

10.2. Generic Types of WWII German Air Delivered Ordnance

To provide an informed assessment of the hazards posed by any items of unexploded ordnance that may remain in situ on site, the table below provides information on the types of German air delivered ordnance most commonly used by the Luftwaffe during WWII. Images and brief summaries of the characteristics of these items of ordnance are listed in **Appendices i-iii**.

Generic Types of WWII German Air Delivered Ordnance		
Type	**Frequency**	**Likelihood of Detection**
High Explosive (HE) bombs	In terms of weight of ordnance dropped, HE bombs were the most frequently deployed by the Luftwaffe during WWII.	Although efforts were made to identify the presence of unexploded ordnance following an air raid, often the damage and destruction caused by detonated bombs made observation of UXB entry holes impossible. The entry hole of an unexploded bomb can be as little as 20cm in diameter and was easily overlooked in certain ground conditions (see **Annex E**). Furthermore, ARP documents describe the danger of assuming that damage, actually caused by a large UXB, was due to an exploded smaller bomb. UXBs therefore present the greatest risk to present–day intrusive works.
1kg Incendiary bombs (IB)	In terms of the number of weapons dropped, small IBs were the most numerous. Millions of these were dropped throughout WWII.	IBs had very limited penetration capability and in urban areas would often have been located in post-raid surveys. If they failed to initiate and fell in water, on soft vegetated ground, or bombed rubble, they could easily go unnoticed.
Large Incendiary bombs (IB)	These were not as common as the 1kg IBs, although they were more frequently deployed than PMs and AP bomblets.	If large IBs did penetrate the ground, complete combustion did not always occur and in such cases they could remain a risk to intrusive works.
Aerial or Parachute mines (PM)	These were deployed less frequently than HE and IBs due to size, cost and the difficulty of deployment.	If functioning correctly, PMs would generally have had a slow rate of descent and were very unlikely to have penetrated the ground. Where the parachute failed, mines would have simply shattered on impact if the main charge failed to explode. There have been extreme cases when these items have been found unexploded. However, in these scenarios, the ground was either extremely soft or the munition fell into water.
Anti-personnel (AP) bomblets	These were not commonly used and are generally considered to pose a low risk to most works in the UK.	SD2 bomblets were packed into containers holding between 6 and 108 submunitions. They had little ground penetration ability and should have been located by the post-raid survey unless they fell into water, dense vegetation or bomb rubble.

10.3. Failure Rate of German Air Delivered Ordnance

It has been estimated that 10% of WWII German air delivered HE bombs failed to explode as designed. Reasons for why such weapons might have failed to function as designed include:

- Malfunction of the fuze or gain mechanism (manufacturing fault, sabotage by forced labour or faulty installation).
- Many were fitted with a clockwork mechanism that could become immobilised on impact.
- Failure of the bomber aircraft to arm the bombs due to human error or an equipment defect.
- Jettisoning the bomb before it was armed or from a very low altitude. This most likely occurred if the bomber aircraft was under attack or crashing.

From 1940 to 1945, bomb disposal teams reportedly dealt with a total of 50,000 explosive items of 50kg, over 7,000 anti-aircraft projectiles and 300,000 beach mines. Unexploded ordnance is still regularly encountered across the UK, see press articles in **Annex F**.

10.4. UXB Ground Penetration

An important consideration when assessing the risk from a UXB is the likely maximum depth of burial. There are several factors which determine the depth that an unexploded bomb will penetrate:

- Mass and shape of bomb.
- Height of release.
- Velocity and angle of bomb.
- Nature of the ground cover.
- Underlying geology.

Geology is perhaps the most important variable. If the ground is soft, there is a greater potential of deeper penetration. For example, peat and alluvium are easier to penetrate than gravel and sand, whereas layers of hard strata will significantly retard and may stop the trajectory of a UXB.

10.4.1. The J-Curve Principle

J-curve is the term used to describe the characteristic curve commonly followed by an air delivered bomb dropped from height after it penetrates the ground. Typically, as the bomb is slowed by its passage through underlying soils, its trajectory curves towards the surface. Many UXBs are found with their nose cone pointing upwards as a result of this effect. More importantly, however, is the resulting horizontal offset from the point of entry. This is typically a distance of about one third of the bomb's penetration depth, but can be higher in certain conditions (see **Annex E**).

10.4.2. WWII UXB Ground Penetration Studies

During WWII the Ministry of Home Security undertook a major study on actual bomb penetration depths, carrying out statistical analysis on the measured depths of 1,328 bombs as reported by bomb disposal (BD) teams. Conclusions were drawn predicting the likely average and maximum depths of penetration of different sized bombs in different geological strata.

For example, the largest common German bomb (500kg) had a likely concluded penetration depth of 6m in sand or gravel but 11m in clay. The maximum observed depth for a 500kg bomb was 11.4m and for a 1,000kg bomb 12.8m. Theoretical calculations suggested that significantly greater penetration depths were probable.

10.4.3. Site Specific Bomb Penetration Considerations

When considering an assessment of the bomb penetration at the site of proposed works the following parameters should be used:

- WWII geology – London Clay Formation.
- Impact angle and velocity – 10-15° from vertical and 270 metres per second.
- Bomb mass and configuration – The 500kg SC HE bomb, without retarder units or armour piercing nose (this was the largest of the common bombs used against Britain).

It has not been possible to determine maximum bomb penetration capabilities at this stage due to the limitations of site-specific geotechnical information provided for the purpose of this report. An assessment can be made once further information becomes available or by an UXO Specialist on-site.

10.5. V-Weapons

Hitler's 'V-weapon' campaign began from mid-1944. It used newly developed unmanned cruise missiles and rockets. The V-1, known as the flying bomb or pilotless aircraft, and the V-2, a long range rocket, were launched from bases in Germany and occupied Europe. A total of 9,251 V-1s and 1,115 V-2s were recorded in the United Kingdom.

Although these weapons caused considerable damage, their relatively low numbers allowed accurate records of strikes to be maintained. These records have mostly survived. There is a negligible risk from unexploded V-weapons on land today. Even if the 1,000kg warhead failed to explode, the weapons are so large that they would have been observed and dealt with at the time. Therefore, any V-weapons referenced in this report are referenced not as a viable risk factor, but primarily in order to help account for evidence of damage and clearance reported.

11. The Likelihood of Contamination from German Air Delivered UXBs

11.1. World War I

During WWI Britain was targeted and bombed by Zeppelin Airships as well as Gotha and Giant fixed-wing aircraft. The objective of these raids was to unnerve the British public, to destroy strategic targets and to ultimately attempt to coerce Britain's capitulation from the war. A WWI map of air raids and naval bombardments across the UK was consulted, see **Annex G**. This source shows that no incidents were recorded in the vicinity of Iver.

WWI bombs were generally smaller and dropped from a lower altitude than those used in WWII. This resulted in limited UXB penetration depths. Aerial bombing was often such a novelty at the time that it attracted public interest and even spectators to watch the raids in progress. For these reasons there is a limited risk that UXBs passed undiscovered in the urban environment. When combined with the relative infrequency of attacks and an overall low bombing density, the risk from WWI UXBs is considered low and will not be further addressed in this report.

11.2. World War II Bombing of the Rural District of Eton

The Luftwaffe's main objective for the attacks on Britain was to inhibit the country's economic and military capability. To achieve this they targeted airfields, depots, docks, warehouses, wharves, railway lines, factories, and power stations. As the war progressed the Luftwaffe bombing campaign expanded to include the indiscriminate bombing of civilian areas in an attempt to subvert public morale.

During WWII the site was located within the Rural District of Eton, which sustained an overall low density of bombing, as represented by bomb density data figure, see Section 11.3. This district was not a priority target for the Luftwaffe, although targets of significance were identified in the site's local area, including Langley Airfield approximately 930m south-west of the site – photography of which is presented in **Annex H**. Langley Airfield was home to Hawker's main fighter assembly plant, and was attacked on several occasions.

Records of bombing incidents in the civilian areas of the district were typically collected by Air Raid Precautions wardens and collated by Civil Defence personnel. Some other organisations, such as port and railway authorities, maintained separate records. Records would be in the form of typed or hand written incident notes, maps and statistics. Bombing data was carefully analysed, not only due to the requirement to identify those parts of the country most needing assistance, but also in an attempt to find patterns in the Germans' bombing strategy in order to predict where future raids might take place.

Records of bombing incidents are presented in the following sections.

11.3. WWII Home Office Bombing Statistics

The following table summarises the quantity of German air delivered bombs (excluding 1kg incendiaries and anti-personnel bombs) dropped on the Rural District of Eton between 1940 and 1945.

Record of German Ordnance Dropped on the Rural District of Eton		
Area Acreage		35,537
Weapons	High Explosive bombs (all types)	474
	Parachute mines	15
	Oil bombs	10
	Phosphorus bombs	7
	Fire pots	0
	Pilotless aircraft (V-1)	5
	Long range rocket bombs (V-2)	2
Total		513
Number of Items per 1,000 acres		14.4
Source: Home Office Statistics This table does not include UXO found during or after WWII.		

Detailed records of the quantity and locations of the 1kg incendiary and anti-personnel bombs were not routinely maintained by the authorities as they were frequently too numerous to record. Although the risk relating to IBs is lesser than that relating to larger HE bombs, they were similarly designed to inflict damage and injury. Anti-personnel bombs were used in much smaller quantities and are rarely found today but are potentially more dangerous. Although Home Office statistics did not record these types of ordnance, both should not be overlooked when assessing the general risk to personnel and equipment.

11.4. 'Bombs over Bucks' Map

To commemorate the 75th Anniversary of the start of WWII, Buckinghamshire County Council compiled the written war record for the entire county and published an online bomb plot map in 2014. It shows the general location of German bomb strikes, as well as V-1 flying bombs and allied incidents. The resource is interactive, with each bomb symbol giving information as to the date and nature of the incident. It should be noted that the location of plots on the map might not be the exact location of these incidents. The section showing the area of the site and details of the closest bombing incidents are described in the table below and presented in **Annex I**.

'Bombs over Bucks' Map		
Date Range	Record Transcription	Comments
20th September 1940	Unexploded bomb or AA Shell in Sheen House, Wellesley Avenue, Ricking Park, Iver.	This incident is plotted approximately 490m south-east of the site boundary.
26th October 1940	Mansions Lane, Iver Heath.	This incident is plotted approximately 590m west of the site boundary.

11.5. Ministry of Home Security Bomb Census Reports

Bomb census reports for Civil Defence Region 6 (South) – which includes the site area – which were compiled by the Research and Experiments Branch of the Ministry of Home Security during WWII were obtained from the National Archives. These reports recorded information such as the date, time, type and damage caused by bomb incidents for a selected time period in the region and are therefore not often comprehensive.

A transcript of the associated written records of bomb incidents in the site area is presented in the table below. Only those recorded incidents on or in close proximity to the site have been highlighted. Imagery of this record is presented in **Annex J**.

Ministry of Home Security Bomb Census Reports			
Date	Size of bomb	Record Transcription	Comments
15th/16th February 1941	50kg	Home Farm, Richings Park, Iver. Bomb fell in stream 600' N of farm buildings.	Fell approximately 500m south of the site boundary.
25th February 1941	50kg	Bomb 12: Bomb fell on edge of balloon barrage site 480' NE of No. 11. Balloon fired.	*Note: Entire incident comprised 17 bombs, although only 12-17 included here – those in relatively close proximity to the site. These are visualised in a German Incidents Overlay presented in* ***Annex P****.* Bomb 12 fell approximately 380m south of the site boundary.
		Bomb 13 (UXB): Bomb fell 230' N of No 12. No damage.	Bomb 13 (UXB) fell approximately 170m south of the site boundary.
		Bomb 14: Bomb fell 400' NW of No. 12. No damage.	Bomb 14 fell approximately 230m south-west of the site boundary.
		Bomb 15: Bomb fell 140' NE of No 14. No damage.	Bomb 15 fell approximately 180m south-west of the site boundary.
		Bomb 16: Bomb fell on edge of gravel pit 300' NE of No 15, 160' S of main railway line. No damage.	Bomb 16 fell approximately 180m south of the site boundary.
		Bomb 17: Bomb fell in gravel pit 50' from railway line. Damage to telephone overhead wires.	Bomb 17 fell approximately 90m south of the site boundary.

11.6. Buckinghamshire ARP Message Forms

ARP Message Forms for Buckinghamshire were obtained from the Centre for Buckinghamshire Studies, which include communications between ARP staff recording bombing incidents. A transcript of the relevant written records is presented in the table below. Example imagery of these entries are presented in **Annex K**.

Buckinghamshire ARP Message Forms			
Date	Type of bomb	Record Transcription	Comments
26th/28th October 1940	**HE, IBs**	**Near Britannic Cable Works, and on either side of GW Railway near Iver Signal Box.**	**The Britannic Cable Works is adjacent to the north-eastern corner of the site. Iver Signal Box is immediately south of the site boundary.**
23rd May 1941	H	2 craters in Wingrove's Farm, East of Mansion Lane, near the south end of Mead's Cottages.	The southern end of Mead's Cottages is approximately 520m north-west of the site boundary.

11.7. Bomb Record for Slough and Eton Districts

A Bomb Record for the Slough Borough, and Eton Urban and Rural Districts compiled by ARP staff was obtained from the Centre for Buckinghamshire studies. This record set includes the date and location of the incident, and the type of ordnance involved. A transcript of the relevant written records is presented in the table below. Example imagery of these entries are presented in **Annex L**.

Buckinghamshire Damage to Properties Register			
Date	Type of bomb	Record Transcription	Comments
5th-6th September 1940	**IB**	**Britannic Cables Works, Iver Brickfields. Large number of incendiaries.**	**The Britannic Cable Works is adjacent to the north-eastern corner of the site. The Iver Brickfields covered a large area in the general vicinity of the town of Iver.**
26th October 1940	HE, IB, Oil bombs	Britannic Cable Works, GWR Signal Station, North bank of canal – Richings Park.	The Britannic Cable Works is adjacent to the north-eastern corner of the site. Iver Signal Box is immediately south of the site boundary.
	5 HE (including 1 delayed action)	Richings Park and Thorney Church.	RIchings Park is immediately south of the site boundary; St Leonard's Church, previously known as Thorney Church, is approximately 720m south-east of the site boundary.
29th October 1940	1 HE, 1 oil bomb	Field NE of Chequer Bridge, Iver.	The field north-east of Chequer Bridge borders the site to the west, although the precise location of the bombs is not provided.
6th November 1940	HE	300' NW of Richings Park Home Farm, Iver.	Approximately 900m south of the site boundary.

23rd February 1941	15 HE	Gravel Pit west of Richings Park to 150 yards north of Home Farm, HE. Slight damage to house property in Richings Park and North Park. Telephone lines down on GWR. Barrage Balloon set on fire. 1 unexploded, 100 yards south of Dog Kennel Bridge.	Based on the nearness of the date and the locations provided, it is assumed that this entry refers to the same raid recorded in the Bomb Census Reports in Section 11.5.

11.8. Buckinghamshire Damage to Properties Register

Written ARP Incident Records were obtained from the Centre for Buckinghamshire Studies. This record was compiled by local Air Raid Precaution (ARP) personnel and volunteers during the war and records the location, date and time of bombing raids, as well as the types of bomb used and the damage caused. A transcript of the relevant written records is presented in the table below. Example imagery of these entries are presented in **Annex M**.

Buckinghamshire Damage to Properties Register			
Date	Type of bomb	Record Transcription	Comments
23rd/24th February 1941	14 HE	Richings Park, Iver. Damage to house property. Wires brought down. One barrage balloon destroyed by fire.	A barrage balloon is visible on WWII-era aerial photography of the site (**Annex O**), approximately 280m south of the site boundary. Based on the nearness of the date and the location, it is assumed that this entry refers to the same raid recorded in the Bomb Census Reports in Section 11.5.

11.9. WWII-Era Aerial Photography

WWII-era aerial photography for the site area was obtained from the National Monuments Record Office (Historic England). This photography provides a record of the potential composition of the site during the war, as well as its condition immediately following the war (see **Annex N**).

WWII-Era Aerial Photography	
Date/Title	Description
6th June 1942 (**Annex N1-N2**)	In this mid-war vertical photograph, most of the site appears to be occupied by a quarry (highlighted in **Annex N2**), with the remainder largely comprising undeveloped land including woodland to the south-west. A railway siding is also visible in the south of the site. The site is bound to the north by a canal, to the south by railway lines, and to the east and west by undeveloped land. Several circular areas of discolouration which are potential indicators of bomb cratering are visible on site, although due to the condition of the ground following quarrying works as well as the quality of the photo, it is difficult to distinguish signs of bombing with certainty.
4th March 1944 (**Annex N3-N4**)	In this late-war oblique photograph, the composition of the site and its immediate surrounds appears largely analogous to the 1942 photo. As with the previous photograph, ground conditions preclude a definitive assessment of potential signs of bomb damage, although what appears to be a crater with a raised lip – possibly bomb-related – is highlighted in **Annex N4**.

12th October 1945 (**Annex N5-N6**)	In this post-WWII vertical photograph, the composition of the site and its immediate surrounds appears largely analogous to the previous photography. Again, ground conditions preclude a definitive assessment of potential signs of bomb damage, although two circular ground indentations – possibly bomb craters - are visible, highlighted in **Annex N6**.

11.10. Abandoned Bombs

A post air-raid survey of buildings, facilities, and installations would have included a search for evidence of bomb entry holes. If evidence of an entry hole was encountered, Bomb Disposal Officer Teams would normally have been requested to attempt to locate, render safe, and dispose of the bomb. Occasionally, evidence of UXBs was discovered but due to a relatively benign position, access problems, or a shortage of resources the UXB could not be exposed and rendered safe. Such an incident may have been recorded and noted as an 'abandoned bomb'.

Given the inaccuracy of WWII records, and the fact that these bombs were 'abandoned', their locations cannot be considered definitive or the lists exhaustive. The MoD states that 'action to make the devices safe would be taken only if it was thought they were unstable'. It should be noted that other than the 'officially' abandoned bombs, there will inevitably be UXBs that were never recorded.

1st Line Defence holds no records of officially registered abandoned bombs at or near the site of the proposed works.

11.11. Bomb Disposal Tasks

The information service from the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Archive Information Office at 33 Engineer Regiment (now part of 29 EOD & Search Group) no longer processes commercial requests for information. It has therefore not been possible to include any updated official information regarding bomb disposal/clearance tasks with regards to this site. A database of known disposal/clearance tasks has been referred to which does not make reference to such instances occurring within the site of proposed works. If any relevant information is received at a later date, Concept Engineering Consultants Ltd will be advised.

11.12. Evaluation of German Air Delivered UXO Records

German Air Delivered UXO Records Summary	
Factors	**Conclusion**
Density of Bombing *It is important to consider the bombing density when assessing the possibility that UXBs remain in an area. High bombing density could allow for error in record keeping due to extreme damage caused to the area.*	During WWII, the site was located within the Rural District of Eton, which sustained an overall low density of bombing, as represented by bomb density data figure, see Section 11.3. This district was not a priority target for the Luftwaffe, although targets of significance were identified in the site's local area, including Langley Airfield approximately 930m south-west of the site – photography of which is presented in **Annex H**. Langley Airfield was home to Hawker's main fighter assembly plant, and was attacked on several occasions. Across the sources consulted, multiple bombing incidents are recorded within or in close proximity to the site boundary, which are illustrated in a German Incidents Overlay in **Annex P**. These include HE bombs and IBs which fell *on either side of the railway near Iver Signal Box*, which includes the south-eastern section of the site, and HE bombs, oil bombs and IBs in the vicinity of the Britannia Cable Works, which bordered the site to the north-east. Multiple HE bombs are also recorded immediately south of the site boundary.
Damage *If buildings or structures on a site sustained bomb or fire damage, any resulting rubble and debris could have obscured the entry holes of unexploded bombs dropped during the same or later raids. Similarly, a high explosive bomb strike in an area of open agricultural land will have caused soil disturbance, increasing the risk that a UXB entry hole would be overlooked.*	WWII-era and post-war aerial photography of the site was available for consultation, although the ground disturbances across the site as a result of quarrying preclude a definitive assessment of potential bomb damage. Despite this, several circular indentations in the ground on site can be recognised, potentially indicating bomb craters.
Ground Cover *The nature of the ground cover present during WWII would have a substantial influence on any visual indication that may indicate UXO being present.*	As a significant portion of the site comprised quarried ground, as well as an adjacent forest, ground conditions across the site are considered to have been largely unconducive to the detection of UXO. A bomb entry hole could be as small as 20cm in diameter, and therefore easily obscured in such conditions.
Access Frequency *UXO in locations where access was irregular would have a greater chance of passing unnoticed than at those that were regularly occupied. The importance of a site to the war effort is also an important consideration as such sites are likely to have been both frequently visited and subject to post- raid checks for evidence of UXO.*	Although some level of wartime access is expected in association with quarrying works on site, levels of monitor and observation – particularly regarding post-raid inspections seeking out any evidence of UXO – are not anticipated to have been particularly high across areas of the site already quarried, or covered by dense vegetation.
Bomb Failure Rate	There is no evidence to suggest that the bomb failure rate in the locality of the site would have been dissimilar to the 10% normally used.
Abandoned Bombs	1st Line Defence holds no records of abandoned bombs at or within the site vicinity.

Bombing Decoy sites	1st Line Defence could find no evidence of bombing decoy sites within the site vicinity.
Bomb Disposal Tasks	1st Line Defence could find no evidence of bomb disposal tasks within the site boundary and immediate area.

12. Introduction to Allied Ordnance

12.1. General

Many areas across the UK may be at risk from Allied UXO because of both wartime and peacetime military use. Typical military activities and uses that may have led to a legacy of military UXO at a site include former minefields, home guard positions, anti-aircraft emplacements, training and firing ranges, military camps, as well as weapons manufacture and storage areas.

Although land formerly used by the military was usually subject to clearance before returned to civilian use, items of UXO are sometimes discovered and can present a potential risk to construction projects.

This section of the report discusses the generic types of Allied ordnance typically encountered on areas associated with former military activity.

12.2. Defending the UK From Aerial Attack

During WWII the War Office employed a number of defence tactics against the Luftwaffe from bombing major towns, cities, manufacturing areas, ports and airfields. These can be divided into passive and active defences (examples are provided in the table below).

Active Defences	Passive Defences
• Anti-aircraft gun emplacements to engage enemy aircraft. • Fighter aircraft to act as interceptors. • Rockets and missiles were used later during WWII.	• Blackouts and camouflaging to hinder the identification of Luftwaffe targets. • Decoy sites were located away from targets and used dummy buildings and lighting to replicate urban, military, or industrial areas. • Barrage balloons forced enemy aircraft to greater altitudes. • Searchlights were often used to track and divert adversary bomber crews during night raids.

Active defences such as anti-aircraft artillery present a greater risk of UXO contamination than passive defences. Unexploded ordnance resulting from dogfights and fighter interceptors is rarely encountered and difficult to accurately qualify.

12.3. Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA)

During WWII three main types of gun sites existed: heavy anti-aircraft (HAA), light anti-aircraft (LAA) and 'Z' batteries (ZAA). If the projectiles and rockets fired from these guns failed to explode or strike an aircraft they would descend back to land. The table below provides further information on the operation and ordnance associated with these type of weapons.

Anti-Aircraft Artillery				
Item	**Description**			
HAA	These large calibre guns such as the 3.7" QF (Quick Firing) were used to engage high flying enemy bombers. They often fired large HE projectiles, which were usually initiated by integral fuzes, triggered by impact, area, time delay or a combination of aforementioned mechanisms.			
LAA	These mobile guns were intended to engage fast, low flying aircraft. They were typically rotated between locations on the perimeters of towns and strategically important industrial works. As they could be moved to new positions with relative ease when required, records of their locations are limited. The most numerous of these were the 40mm Bofors gun which could fire up to 120 x 40mm HE projectiles per minute to over 1,800m.			
Variations in HAA and LAA Ammunition	**Gun type**	**Calibre**	**Shell Weight**	**Shell Dimensions**
	3.0 Inch	76mm	7.3kg	76mm x 356mm
	3.7 Inch	94mm	12.7kg	94mm x 438mm
	4.5 Inch	114mm	24.7kg	114mm x 578mm
	40mm	40mm	0.9kg	40mm x 311mm
Z-AA	Rockets were commonly designed to destroy heavily armoured military vehicles (anti-tank weapon). The device contains an explosive head (warhead) that can be accelerated using internal propellants to an intended target. Anti-aircraft rocket batteries were also utilised as part of air defence measures.			

The conditions in which anti-aircraft projectiles may have fallen unnoticed within a site area are analogous to those regarding air delivered ordnance. Unexploded anti-aircraft projectiles could essentially have fallen indiscriminately anywhere within range of the guns. The chance of such items being observed, reported and removed during the war depends on factors such as land use, ground cover, damage and frequency of access – the same factors that govern whether evidence of a UXB is likely to have been noted. More information about these factors with regards to this particular site can be found in the German Air Delivered Ordnance section of this report.

Illustrations of Anti-Aircraft artillery, projectiles and rockets are presented at **Appendix iv**.

13. The Likelihood of Contamination from Allied Ordnance

13.1. Introduction

There are several factors that may serve to either affirm, increase, or decrease the level of risk within a site with a history of military usage. Such factors are typically dependent upon the proximity of the proposed area of works to training activities, munition productions and storage, as well as its function across the years.

This section will examine the history of the proposed site and assess to what degree, if any, the site could have become contaminated as a result of the military use of the surrounding area.

13.2. Military History of the Site of Proposed Works

During WWII, the site was approximately 930m north-east of Langley Airfield, which also housed the Hawker fighter assembly plant. This was protected by a ring of defences, including anti-aircraft guns, barrage balloons, and searchlights. This included Searchlight Battery 505, stationed south-west of the town of Iver, immediately north of the site boundary.[1] Structures associated with this battery, as well as a barrage balloon site, are visible to the north and the south of the site boundary respectively – highlighted in WWII-era aerial photography in **Annex O**.

13.3. Evaluation of Contamination Risk from Allied UXO

1st Line Defence has considered the following potential sources of Allied ordnance contamination:

Allied UXO Records Summary	
Sources of Allied UXO Contamination	**Conclusion**
Military Camps *Military camps present an elevated risk from ordnance simply due to the large military presence and likelihood of associated live ordnance training.*	Online sources and WWII-era aerial photography record the presence of a searchlight battery to the north of the site, on the opposite bank of the canal, with accommodation buildings visible near the site boundary. No evidence to suggest that the site was directly occupied by military forces could be identified, however.
Anti-Aircraft Defences *Anti-Aircraft defences were employed across the country. Proximity to anti-aircraft defences increases the chance of encountering AA projectiles.*	1st Line Defence could find no evidence of Anti-Aircraft defences such as a HAA or LAA gun emplacement occupying or bordering the site. The closest HAA was located approximately 800m east of the site, in the vicinity of Iver. Despite this distance the maximum effective range of an AA projectile can be up to 15km. The conditions in which HAA or LAA projectiles may have fallen unnoticed within a site footprint are generally analogous to those regarding German air delivered ordnance.
Home Guard Activity *The Home Guard regularly undertook training and ordnance practice in open areas, as well as burying ordnance as part of anti-invasion defences.*	Evidence of Home Guard activity is often difficult to locate, owing to the ad-hoc nature of Home Guard activity within each local area. Such training was often conducted on a small scale at the discretion of individual commanders and as such was seldom recorded officially. As such, no positive evidence could be found to confirm the presence of HG units within proximity to the site.

[1] https://www.heritagegateway.org.uk/Gateway/Results_Single.aspx?uid=8e9675c2-92ea-4245-bae4-b854e4f6bedb&resourceID=19191.

Defensive Positions *Defensive positions suggest the presence of military activity, which is often indicative of ordnance storage, usage or disposal.*	A barrage balloon site is visible on WWII-era photography approximately 280m south of the site boundary.
Training or firing ranges *Areas of ordnance training saw historical ordnance usage in large numbers, often with inadequate disposal of expended and live items. The presence of these ranges significantly impact on the risk of encountering items of ordnance in their vicinity.*	No evidence of training or firing ranges could be found within the site or surrounding area.
Defensive Minefields *Minefields were placed in strategic areas to defend the country in the event of a German invasion. Minefields were not always cleared with an appropriate level of vigilance.*	There is no evidence of defensive minefields affecting the site.
Ordnance Manufacture *Ordnance manufacture indicates an increased chance that items of ordnance were stored, or disposed of, within a location.*	No information of ordnance being stored, produced, or disposed of within the proposed site could be found.
Military Related Airfields *Military airfields present an elevated risk from ordnance simply due to the large military presence and likelihood of associated live ordnance training or bombing practice.*	The site was approximately 930m north-east of Langley Airfield.

14. The Likelihood of UXO Contamination Summary

The following table assesses the likelihood that the site was contaminated by items of German air delivered and Allied ordnance. Factors such as the risk of UXO initiation, remaining, and encountering will be discussed later in the report.

UXO Contamination Summary	
Quality of the Historical Record	The research has evaluated pre- and post-WWII Ordnance Survey maps, WWI UK incident mapping, Luftwaffe reconnaissance imagery, 'Bombs over Bucks' online bomb mapping, Ministry of Home Security Bomb Census Reports, Buckinghamshire ARP Message Forms, a Bomb Record for Slough and Eton Districts, a Buckinghamshire Damage to Properties Register, WWII-era aerial photography of the site, and online resources including Heritage Gateway.
German Air-Delivered Ordnance	• During WWII, the site was located within the Rural District of Eton, which sustained an overall low density of bombing, as represented by bomb density data figure, see Section 11.3. This district was not a priority target for the Luftwaffe, although targets of significance were identified in the site's local area, including Langley Airfield approximately 930m south-west of the site – photography of which is presented in **Annex H**. Langley Airfield was home to Hawker's main fighter assembly plant, and was attacked on several occasions. Allied military features in the site's proximity include a searchlight battery and barrage balloon site, which would have also presented viable targets. • Across the sources consulted, multiple bombing incidents are recorded within or in close proximity to the site boundary, which are illustrated in a German Incidents Overlay in **Annex P**. These include HE bombs and IBs which fell on either side of the railway near Iver Signal Box, which includes the south-eastern section of the site, and HE bombs, oil bombs and IBs in the vicinity of the Britannia Cable Works, which bordered the site to the north-east. Multiple HE bombs are also recorded immediately south of the site boundary. • WWII-era and post-war aerial photography of the site was available for consultation. Although the ground disturbances across the site as a result of quarrying preclude a definitive assessment of potential bomb damage, several circular indentations in the ground on site can be recognised, potentially indicating bomb craters. • As a significant portion of the site comprised quarried ground, as well as an adjacent forest, ground conditions across the site are considered to have been largely unconducive to the easy detection of UXO. A UXB entry hole could be as small as 20cm in diameter (much smaller for 1kg incendiary bombs, which were recorded in the general area), and therefore easily obscured in such conditions. • Although some level of wartime access is expected in association with quarrying works on site, levels of monitor and observation – particularly regarding post-raid inspections seeking out any evidence of UXO – are not anticipated to have been particularly high across areas of the site already quarried, or covered by dense vegetation. • In summary, multiple bombing incidents are recorded within or in close proximity to the site boundary, which are illustrated in a German Incidents Overlay in **Annex P**. These include HE bombs and IBs which fell on either side of the railway adjacent to the site, and HE bombs, oil bombs and IBs in the vicinity of the Britannia Cable Works, which bordered the site to the north-east. As a significant portion of the site comprised quarried and wooded ground, ground conditions and access levels across the site are considered to have been largely unconducive to the detection of UXO. Overall, the site has been assessed at a precautionary **Medium Risk** of German UXO contamination. Proactive on-site Risk Mitigation measures are therefore recommended. However, it should be noted that proactive support is not deemed necessary for any works which are planned within the level of post-war fill on site – only where works are to exceed this and affect WWII-ground level – as it is relatively unlikely that large items of UXO such as HE bombs were introduced onto the site through backfill.

Allied Ordnance	• Online sources and WWII-era photography indicate that the site was adjacent to a searchlight battery to the north, and a barrage balloon site to the south, part of the defensive network protecting Langley Airfield. However, no evidence to suggest that the site was directly affected by military activity could be identified. the site has therefore been assessed as holding an overall **Low Risk** of Allied UXO • The closest HAA battery was located approximately 800m east of the site, in the vicinity of Iver. Despite this distance the maximum effective range of an AA projectile can be up to 15km. The conditions in which HAA or LAA projectiles may have fallen unnoticed within the site boundary are however analogous to those regarding air delivered ordnance.

15. The Likelihood that UXO Remains

15.1. Introduction

It is important to consider the extent to which any explosive ordnance clearance (EOC) activities or extensive ground works have occurred on site. This may indicate previous ordnance contamination or reduce the risk that ordnance remains undiscovered.

15.2. UXO Clearance

1st Line Defence has found no evidence in the public domain or within internal records that any official ordnance clearance operations have taken place on site. Note however that we have not received confirmation of this fact from the 33 EOD Regiment Archive (now part of 29 EOD & Search Group). It should also be noted that in addition to 29 EOD & Search Group archival information, 1st Line Defence also do not currently have access to data that may be relevant including 5131(BD)SQN Archive, SD Training Technical Advisory Section (TAS) and MACA Records (bomb disposal callouts).

If such information is available at a later date, it is recommended that it be reviewed as it will assist with understanding both levels and types of contamination likely to be present, and may indicate risk reduction in certain areas.

15.3. Post-War Redevelopment

Comparison of WWII-era and recent aerial imagery indicates that the central portion of the site was previously occupied by a quarry, which has since been filled. Post-WWII OS mapping indicates that the western portion of the site was previously occupied by a concrete works and engineering works, which have since been cleared. In the present day, most of the site is occupied by Thorney Business Park, also a post-war development.

The risk of UXO remaining is considered to be mitigated at the location of and down to the depth of any post-war redevelopment on site. For example, the risk from deep buried UXO will only have been mitigated within the volumes of any post-war pile foundations or deep excavations for basement levels. The risk will however remain within virgin geology below and amongst these post-war works, down to the maximum bomb penetration depth.

16. The Likelihood of UXO Encounter

16.1. Introduction

For UXO to pose a risk at a site, there should be a means by which any potential UXO might be encountered on that site.

The likelihood of encountering UXO on the site of proposed works would depend on various factors, such as the type of UXO that might be present and the intrusive works planned on site. In most cases, UXO is more likely to be present below surface (buried) than on surface.

In general, the greater the extent and depth of intrusive works, the greater the risk of encountering. The most likely scenarios under which items of UXO could be encountered during construction works is during piling, drilling operations or bulk excavations for basement levels. The overall risk will depend on the extent of the works, such as the numbers of boreholes/piles (if required) and the volume of the excavations.

Generally speaking, the risk of encountering any type of UXO will be minimal for any works planned within the footprint and down to the depth of post-war foundations and excavations.

16.2. Encountering Air Delivered Ordnance

Since an air delivered bomb may come to rest at any depth between just below ground level and its maximum penetration depth, there is a chance that such an item (if present) could be encountered during shallow excavations (for services or site investigations) into the original WWII ground level as well as at depth.

17. The Likelihood of UXO Initiation

17.1. Introduction

UXO does not spontaneously explode. Older UXO devices will require an external event/energy to create the conditions for detonation to occur. The likelihood that a device will function can depend on a number of factors including the type of weaponry, its age and the amount of energy it is struck with.

17.2. Initiating Air Delivered Ordnance

Unexploded bombs do not spontaneously explode. All high explosive filling requires significant energy to create the conditions for detonation to occur.

In recent decades, there have been a number of incidents in Europe where Allied UXBs have detonated, and incidents where fatalities have resulted. There have been several hypotheses as to the reason why the issue is more prevalent in mainland Europe – reasons could include the significantly greater number of bombs dropped by the Allied forces on occupied Europe, the preferred use by the Allies of mechanical rather than electrical fuzes, and perhaps just good fortune. The risk from UXO in the UK is also being treated very seriously in many sectors of the construction industry, and proactive risk mitigation efforts will also have affected the lack of detonations in the UK.

There are certain construction activities which make initiation more likely, and several potential initiation mechanisms must be considered:

UXB Initiation	
Direct Impact	Unless the fuze or fuze pocket is struck, there needs to be a significant impact e.g. from piling or large and violent mechanical excavation, onto the main body of the weapon to initiate a buried iron bomb. Such violent action can cause the bomb to detonate.
Re- starting the Clock	A small proportion of German WWII bombs employed clockwork fuzes. It is probable that significant corrosion would have taken place within the fuze mechanism over the last 70+ years that would prevent clockwork mechanisms from functioning. Nevertheless, it was reported that the clockwork fuze in a UXB dealt with by 33 EOD Regiment in Surrey in 2002 did re-start.
Friction Impact	The most likely scenario resulting in the detonation of a UXB is friction impact initiating the shock-sensitive fuze explosive. The combined effects of seasonal changes in temperature and general degradation over time can cause explosive compounds to crystallise and extrude out from the main body of the bomb. It may only require a limited amount of energy to initiate the extruded explosive which could detonate the main charge.

18. Consequences of Initiation/Encounter

18.1. Introduction

The repercussions of the inadvertent detonation of UXO during intrusive ground works, or if an item or ordnance is interfered with or disturbed, are potentially profound, both in terms of human and financial cost. A serious risk to life and limb, damage to plant and total site shutdown during follow-up investigations are potential outcomes. However, if appropriate risk mitigation measures are put in place, the chances of initiating an item of UXO during ground works is comparatively low.

The consequences of encountering UXO can be particularly notable in the case of high-profile sites (such as airports and train stations) where it is necessary to evacuate the public from the surrounding area. A site may be closed for anything from a few hours to a week with potentially significant cost in lost time. It should be noted that even the discovery of suspected or possible item of UXO during intrusive works (if handled solely through the authorities), may also involve significant loss of production.

18.2. Consequences of Detonation

When considering the potential consequences of a detonation, it is necessary to identify the significant receptors that may be affected. The receptors that may potentially be at risk from a UXO detonation on a construction site will vary depending on the site specific conditions but can be summarised as follows:

- People – site workers, local residents and general public.
- Plant and equipment – construction plant on site.
- Services – subsurface gas, electricity, telecommunications.
- Structures – not only visible damage to above ground buildings, but potentially damage to foundations and the weakening of support structures.
- Environment – introduction of potentially contaminating materials.

19. 1st Line Defence Risk Assessment

19.1. Risk Assessment Stages

Taking into account the quality of the historical evidence, the assessment of the overall risk from unexploded ordnance is based on the following five considerations:

1. That the site was contaminated with unexploded ordnance.
2. That unexploded ordnance remains on site.
3. That such items will be encountered during the proposed works.
4. That ordnance may be initiated by the works operations.
5. The consequences of encountering or initiating ordnance.

19.2. Assessed Risk Level

1st Line Defence has assessed that there is an overall **Medium Risk** from German and anti-aircraft unexploded ordnance within WWII ground level at the site of proposed works. There is an assessed **Low Risk** from Allied unexploded ordnance.

Ordnance Type	Risk Level			
	Negligible	Low	Medium	High
German Unexploded HE Bombs			✓	
German 1kg Incendiary Bombs			✓	
Anti-Aircraft Artillery Projectiles			✓	
Allied Land Service and Small Arms Ammunition		✓		

20. Proposed Risk Mitigation Methodology

20.1. General

The following risk mitigation measures are recommended to support the proposed works at Thorney Lane, Iver. It should be noted that proactive support is not deemed necessary for any works which are planned within the level of post-war fill on site – only where works are to exceed this and affect WWII-ground level.

Recommended Risk Mitigation Measures	
Activity	**Recommended Risk Mitigation Measure**
All Works	• **UXO Risk Management Plan** It is recommended that a site-specific plan for the management of UXO risk be written for this site. This plan should be kept on site and be referred to in the event that a suspect item of UXO is encountered at any stage of the project. It should detail the steps to be taken in the event of such a discovery, considering elements such as communication, raising the alarm, nominated responsible persons etc. Contact 1st Line Defence for help/more information. • **Site Specific UXO Awareness Briefings to all personnel conducting intrusive works.** As a minimum precaution, all personnel working on the site should be briefed on the basic identification of UXO and what to do in the event of encountering a suspect item. This should in the first instance be undertaken by a UXO Specialist. Posters and information on the risk of UXO can be held in the site office for reference.
Open Excavations within WWII-ground level (trial pits, service pits, bulk excavations, strip foundations etc.)	• **Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Specialist Presence on Site to support open excavations** When on site the role of the UXO Specialist would include: ◦ Monitoring works using visual recognition and instrumentation, including immediate response to reports of suspicious objects or suspected items of ordnance that have been recovered by the ground workers on site. ◦ Providing UXO awareness briefings to any uninformed staff and advise staff of the need to modify working practices to take account of the ordnance risk. ◦ To aid incident management which would involve liaison with the local authorities and police should ordnance be identified and present an explosive hazard.
Boreholes and Piled Foundations within WWII-era ground level	• **Intrusive Magnetometer Survey of all borehole and pile locations down to a maximum bomb penetration depth:** 1st Line Defence can deploy a range of intrusive magnetometer techniques to clear pile locations. The appropriate technique is influenced by a number of factors, but most importantly the site's ground conditions. The appropriate survey methodology would be confirmed once the enabling works have been completed.

In making this assessment and recommending these risk mitigation measures, if known, the works outlined in the 'Scope of the Proposed Works' section were considered. Should the planned works be modified or additional intrusive engineering works be considered, 1st Line Defence should be consulted to see if a re-assessment of the risk or mitigation recommendations is necessary.

1st Line Defence Limited **23/07/2024**

This Report has been produced in compliance with the Construction Industry Research and Information Association (CIRIA) C681 guidelines for the writing of Detailed UXO Risk Assessments.

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This report has been prepared by 1st Line Defence Limited with all reasonable care and skill. The report contains historical data and information from third party sources. 1st Line Defence Limited has sought to verify the accuracy and comprehensiveness of this information where possible but cannot be held accountable for any inherent errors. Furthermore, whilst every reasonable effort has been made to locate and access all relevant historical information, 1st Line Defence cannot be held responsible for any changes to risk level or mitigation recommendations resulting from documentation or other information which may come to light at a later date.

Site Location Maps

Annex: A





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Tel: +44 (0)1992 245 020

Client: Concept Engineering Consultants Ltd

Project: Thorney Lane, Iver

Ref: DA20371-00

Source: Google Maps

Approximate site boundary

N

Recent Aerial Photography

Annex: B

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Approximate site boundary

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Project: Thorney Lane, Iver

Ref: DA20371-00

Source: Google Earth

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Client:	Concept Engineering Consultants Ltd	Approximate site boundary	N
Project:	Thorney Lane, Iver		
Ref:	DA20371-00	Source: Concept Engineering Consultants Ltd	

Pre-WWII Historical Map, 1932

Annex: D1



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Client:	Concept Engineering Consultants Ltd	Approximate site boundary	N
Project:	Thorney Lane, Iver		
Ref:	DA20371-00	Source: Landmark Maps	

Post-WWII Historical Map, 1970

Annex: D2



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Project: Thorney Lane, Iver

Ref: DA20371-00

Source: Landmark Maps

Approximate site boundary

N





Top: J-curve Effect - Due to angle of entry, unexploded bombs would often end their trajectory at a lateral offset from point of entry, often ending up beneath adjacent extant structures/sites.

The photograph **above** shows a 250kg unexploded bomb found in Bermondsey in 2015, pointing upwards, demonstrating 'J-curve'.

One of the most common scenarios for UXO going unnoticed was when a UXB fell into a 'bomb site' (such as the area shown **Top Left**), the entry hole of the bomb obscured by any debris and rubble present. Note that the entry hole of a 50kg UXB could be as little as 20cm in diameter (**Left**).

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Project:	Thorney Lane, Iver
Ref:	DA20371-00
Source:	Various sources

BBC NEWS

WW2 bomb found near London City Airport blown up

An unexploded World War Two bomb found near London City Airport has been detonated.

The 500kg device was discovered at the King George V Dock on Sunday during planned work at the airport.

It was closed and all flights were cancelled on Monday after an exclusion zone was put in place.

The detonation, which took take place off Shoeburyness, Essex, was postponed on Tuesday because of high winds and dangerous conditions for divers.

The 1.5m-long German bomb - which was found in a bed of silt, 15m underwater - was carefully removed from the Thames and placed in a secure location a mile away from the coast of Essex.

500kg German HE Bomb, February 2018

BBC NEWS

Exeter WW2 bomb is detonated after homes evacuated

More than 2,600 households and 12 university halls of residence were cleared before the 2,200lb (1,000kg) device **was destroyed** on Saturday.

Police said the blast left a crater about the size of a double-decker bus.

Police have reported large pieces of metal debris hitting buildings and said some properties in the 100m (330ft) exclusion zone had sustained "structural damage".

1000kg German HE bomb, February 2021

BBC NEWS

Great Yarmouth: Huge blast after unplanned WW2 bomb detonation

A World War Two bomb found in Great Yarmouth has detonated while work was being done to defuse it, causing a huge blast that was heard for miles.

Army specialists were attempting to disarm it when there was an unplanned detonation at about 17:00 GMT.

People on social media said they heard a loud bang and felt buildings shake 15 miles (24km) away.

There have been no reports of injuries among the Army, emergency services or the public, Norfolk Police said.

Cordons were put in place when the bomb was first discovered close to two gas pipes on Tuesday, and work began to make it safe.

250kg German HE Bomb, February 2023

BBC NEWS

Plymouth unexploded WW2 bomb: Thousands of people displaced

A 500kg (1,102lb) German World War Two bomb that forced the evacuation of thousands of people in Plymouth has been detonated at sea.

The unexploded device was **found in a garden** on St Michael Avenue on Tuesday, sparking four days of disruption.

On Friday police closed roads and rail and bus services were stopped as the bomb was transported 1.4 miles (2.3km) through the city's streets.

The device was taken by boat beyond the breakwater and detonated at 21:51 GMT.

500kg German HE Bomb, February 2024

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Client:	Concept Engineering Consultants Ltd
Project:	Thorney Lane, Iver
Ref:	DA20371-00
Source:	BBC News

BASF has confirmed that an explosive device, most likely a World War II-era bomb, caused the blast that left one person injured Tuesday at a plant construction site in Germany.

The explosion was reported at BASF's Ludwigshafen toluene diisocyanate (TDI) plant, which recently broke ground for a 300,000 metric tons per year TDI production plant and other construction to expand its facilities.

BASF Provides Some Details

Responding to a request from *PaintSquare News* for more information on Wednesday (Feb. 27), BASF's manager of media relations and corporate communications Europe, Ursula von Stetten, wrote in an email, "So here [are] the facts: The detonation took place at 10:00 a.m. One person was injured; the injury is not serious. He will be kept in the hospital for some days.

"Cause of the detonation was an explosive device, presumably a bomb deriving from the Second World War. The device detonated when grounding work was done. No details on [a] delay [are] available. At the moment, the exact circumstances of the incident are [being] evaluated."

1st March 2013

SPIEGEL ONLINE

Blast Kills One

World War II Bomb Explodes on German Motorway

A highway construction worker in Germany accidentally struck an unexploded World War II bomb, causing an explosion which killed him and wrecked several passing cars.

A World War II bomb has exploded during construction work on a German highway, killing one worker and injuring several motorists who were driving past, police said.

The worker had been cutting through the road surface near the south-western town of Aschaffenburg when his machine struck the bomb and triggered it. Police said they weren't sure yet what type of bomb it was. "The explosion seems to have been too small for it to have been an aircraft bomb," a police spokesman said.

23rd October 2006

WWII bomb injures 17 at Hattingen construction site

Seventeen people were injured on Friday when a construction crew unwittingly detonated a buried World War II-era bomb in Hattingen.

An excavator apparently drove over a 250-kilogramme (550 pound) American bomb, damaging surrounding buildings. Most of the injured suffered auditory trauma from the blast, and the excavator operator suffered injuries to his hands, police in the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia said.

"The hole was astoundingly small for such a large bomb full of so many explosives," Armin Gebhard, head of the Arnsberg department for military ordnance removal, told The Local. "But of course it damaged all the surrounding buildings too. We are really happy it wasn't worse."

19th September 2013

BBC NEWS

World War II bomb kills three in Germany

A special commission is investigating the causes of the explosion, while prosecutors are considering whether the team leader should face charges of manslaughter through culpable negligence, the BBC's Oana Lungescu reports from Berlin.

The blast happened an hour before the defusing operation was due to start.

Officials said the three men who died were experienced sappers, or combat engineers, who over 20 years had defused up to 700 bombs.

More than 7,000 people were immediately evacuated when the 500kg bomb was found. Several schools, a kindergarten and local companies remain closed.

2nd June 2010

June 2006

Eton bomb: Residents evacuated after unexploded Second World War device found in Berkshire car park

Thames Valley Police said about 50 residents were evacuated from their homes as a precaution

Police were called to the public car park on High Street in Eton, Berkshire, at about 6.25pm on Sunday (Photo: Google)

By Charlie Duffield

Reporter

April 26, 2021 12:49 pm (Updated 1:22 pm)

Police and bomb disposal experts were called to Eton, Berkshire, on Sunday evening after an unexploded device was found in a public car park.

Thames Valley Police said about 50 residents were evacuated from their homes as a precaution, and police erected a 50 metre cordon around the area in the high street, where the bomb, believed to be from the Second World War, was found.



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Ref:	DA20371-00
Source:	J. Morris, German Air Raids on Britain

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

Langley – Airfield

A) Airfield
B) Hawker Assembly Plant

The site, outside the scope of this photograph, is approximately 930m north-east of Langley Airfield and the Hawker assembly plant.

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

(A)

Type of damage:	German air raids
Where:	Mansions lane Iver Heath
When:	Occurred Overnight 26th October 1940
Details:	Damaged to cottage, casualty & electric cables down. Occurred overnight 25th to 26th October.

(B)

Type of damage:	German air raids
Where:	Richings Park Richings Park Iver
When:	20th September 1940
Details:	Unexploded bomb or anti-aircraft shell in Sheen House, Welleslay Avenue, Richings Park, Iver.

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Tel: +44 (0)1992 245 020

Client: Concept Engineering Consultants Ltd

Approximate site boundary

N

Project: Thorney Lane, Iver

Ref: DA20371-00

Source: Buckinghamshire Council

25/26/2/42.

A Bomb No. & Time	B Size of crater.	C Nature of Soil	D Size of Bomb	E Damage (To include distance from centre of crater)
1 1955	-	-	50kg	Home Farm, Richings Park, Iver. Bomb fell in stream 600' N. of farm buildings.
2 1955	-	-	50kg	Home Farm, Richings Park, Iver. Bomb fell in stream 180' N. of farm buildings. Pitting on trees 90' from bomb. No pitting or damage to farm buildings.
3 1955	-	-	100kg	Home Farm, Richings Park, Iver. Direct hit on farm buildings in shape of quadrangle with 75' frontage each side. Bomb hit on S.E. corner. 14" brickwork, 2 storeys high. Detonated on top floor, roof partially demolished, roof timbers 8" x 8" broken in two. Glazing damage up to 120'. Walls deeply pitted all round. Pitting on chimney of house 35' from ground level and 90' from bomb. One cow killed, 3 seriously injured. Cows in stalls west side of quadrangle.
				Home Farm, Richings Park, Iver. buildings. Pitting on trees 90' away and

REPORT ON INCIDENTS NEAR SLOUGH ON 25.2.41. BETWEEN POINT N. OF HOME FARM, RICHINGS PARK, SOUTH OF THORNLEY LANE, AND POINT N. OF THORNLEY LANE, GRAVEL PIT ON SOUTH SIDE OF G.W.R. MAIN LINE.

INCIDENT NO.3. 21.15 HRS.

German plane travelling almost due north dropped 16 H.E. 50 Kg. bombs and 1 UXB. 3,200 ft in length. Slight variable N.E. wind, clear starlit night, no moon. Slight ground haze, no flares or fires burning.

I N C I D E N T NO.3.

(50 Kg) Bomb No.1 Crater size 9' x 3'. Bomb fell in park 260' N.E. of Home Farm, Richings Park, and 15' E. of stream. Very slight tile damage.

(50 Kg) Bomb No.2. Crater size 9' x 3'6". Bomb fell in Park, 320' N. of No.1. and 60' E. of stream. No damage.

(50 Kg) Bomb No.3. Crater size 9' x 3'. Bomb fell in Park 130' E of No.2. No damage.

(50 Kg) Bomb No.4. Crater size 10' x 4'. Bomb fell in Park 120' N. of No.3. No damage.

(50 Kg) Bomb No.5. Crater size 10' x 3'. Bomb fell in Park 230' N.E. of No.4. No damage.

(50 Kg) Bomb No.6. Crater size 7' x 2'6". Bomb fell in small paddock 60' S. of Thorney Lane, 480' E. of West Lodge, Richings Park. No damage.

(50 Kg) Bomb No.7. Crater size 9' x 2'6". Bomb fell 75' N. of Thorney Lane 760' E of West Lodge, Richings Park. No damage

(50 Kg) Bomb No.8. Crater size 8' x 2'6". Bomb fell in open field 340' N of Thorney Lane and 160' E of footpath, 300' N.W. of No.7. No damage.

(50 Kg) Bomb No.9. Crater size 7' x 3'. Bomb fell 320' N.E. of No.8. and 200' from footpath. No damage.

(50 Kg) Bomb No.10. Crater size 13' x 6'6". Bomb fell 210' N.E. of No.9 and 280' from footpath. No damage.

(50 Kg) Bomb No.11. Crater size 9' x 3'. Bomb fell 150' N.W. of No.10 and 140' from footpath. No damage.

(50 Kg) Bomb No.12. Crater size 6' x 1'6". Bomb fell on edge of balloon barrage site 480' N.E. of No.11. Balloon fired. No other damage.

(UXB) Bomb No.13. Crater size 15". Bomb fell 230' N. of No.12. No damage.

(50 Kg) Bomb No.14 Crater size 6' x 2'6". Bomb fell 400' NW of No.12. No damage.

(50 Kg) Bomb No.15. Crater size 8' x 2'6". Bomb fell 140' N.E. of No.14. no damage.

(50 Kg) Bomb No 16) Crater size 6' x 1'6". Bomb fell on edge of gravel pit 300' N.E. of No.15. 160's of main railway line No damage.

(50 Kg) Bomb No.17. Crater size 3' x 1'. Bomb fell in gravel pit 50' from railway line. Damage to telephone overhead wires.

26th/28th October, 1940.

wood.

House wrecked. Cottage demolished, also one slight casualty. H.E. and I.B's near Brittanic Cable Works, and on either side of G.W.Railway near Iver Signal Box. Thorney Church damaged, one H.E. in Richings Park.

May 23rd 1941.

IVER.

1 crater 100 yds. N.W. of the junction of Love Lan and Langley Road.

2 craters in the orchard South of Love Hill House.

1 crater in the field adjacent to the orchard, but East of it.

2 craters in Wingrove's Farm East of Mansion Lane near the South end of Meads Cottages.

Several (number unspecified) in Huntsmoor Park. 1 of these is in the grounds of Huntsmoor Farm.

5th-6th September 1940



Britannia Cable Works and Iver Brickfields. Large group of incendiaries.

26th October 1940



Britannia Cable Works, GWR Signal Station, North bank of canal – Richings Park.
6 HEs, 1 oil bomb, 1 "Molotoff" [IB container].



4 HE. Richings Park and Thorney Church. 1 Delayed Action – 100-150 persons temporarily evacuated.

29th October 1940



1 HE, 1 oil bomb. Field NE of Chequer Bridge, Iver.

6th November 1940



1 HE. 300 yard NW of Richings Home Farm, Iver.

23rd February 1941





Gravel Pit west of Richings Park to 150 yards north of Home Farm, HE.

Slight damage to house property in Richings Park and North Park. Telephone lines down on GWR. Barrage Balloon set on fire.

1 unexploded, 100 yards south of Dog Kennel Bridge.

23rd – 24th February 1941

Richings Park, Iver.	14 HE	Damage to house property. Wires brought down. One barrage balloon destroyed by fire.

RAF Aerial Photography, 6th June 1942

Annex: N1

1ST LINE DEFENCE

Unit 3, Maple Park,
Essex Road, Hoddesdon,
Hertfordshire. EN11 0EX
Email: info@1stlinedefence.co.uk
Tel: +44 (0)1992 245 020

Client: Concept Engineering Consultants Ltd

Approximate site boundary

Project: Thorney Lane, Iver

N

Ref: DA20371-00

Source: National Monuments Record Office (Historic England)

RAF Aerial Photography, 6th June 1942 (Annotated)

Annex: N2

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Project: Thorney Lane, Iver

Ref: DA20371-00

Source: National Monuments Record Office (Historic England)

Approximate site boundary

N

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Project: Thorney Lane, Iver

Ref: DA20371-00

Source: National Monuments Record Office (Historic England)

Approximate site boundary

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Approximate site boundary

Project: Thorney Lane, Iver

Ref: DA20371-00

Source: National Monuments Record Office (Historic England)

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N

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Source: National Monuments Record Office (Historic England)



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Approximate site boundary

Project: Thorney Lane, Iver

N

Ref: DA20371-00

Source: National Monuments Record Office (Historic England)

Allied Military Features (4th March 1944 Photography)

Annex: O

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Project: Thorney Lane, Iver

Ref: DA20371-00

Approximate site boundary

Source: National Monuments Record Office (Historic England)

German Incidents Overlay (1942 photography)



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Tel: +44 (0)1992 245 020

Client: Concept Engineering Consultants Ltd

Project: Thorney Lane, Iver

Ref: DA20371-00

Source: National Monuments Record Office (Historic England)

Approximate site boundary

N

SC 50kg High Explosive Bomb

Bomb Weight	40-54kg (88-119lb)
Explosive Weight	25kg (55lb)
Fuze Type	Impact fuze/electro-mechanical time delay fuze
Bomb Dimensions	1,090 x 280mm (42.9 x 11.0in)
Body Diameter	200mm (7.87in)
Use	Against lightly damageable materials, hangars, railway rolling stock, ammunition depots, light bridges and buildings up to three stories.
Remarks	The smallest and most common conventional German bomb. Nearly 70% of bombs dropped on the UK were 50kg.



SC 250kg High Explosive Bomb

Bomb Weight	245-256kg (540-564lb)
Explosive Weight	125-130kg (276-287lb)
Fuze Type	Electrical impact/mechanical time delay fuze
Bomb Dimensions	1640 x 512mm (64.57 x 20.16in)
Body Diameter	368mm (14.5in)
Use	Against railway installations, embankments, flyovers, underpasses, large buildings and below-ground installations.
Remarks	It could be carried by almost all German bomber aircraft and was used to notable effect by the Junkers Ju-87 Stuka (*Sturzkampfflugzeug*, or dive-bomber).



SC 500kg High Explosive Bomb

Bomb Weight	480-520kg (1,058-1,146lb)
Explosive Weight	250-260kg (551-573lb)
Fuze Type	Electrical impact/mechanical time delay fuze
Bomb Dimensions	1957 x 640mm (77 x 25.2in)
Body Diameter	470mm (18.5in)
Use	Against fixed airfield installations, hangars, assembly halls, flyovers, underpasses, high-rise buildings and below-ground installations.
Remarks	40/60 or 50/50 Amatol TNT, Trialene. Bombs recovered with Trialen filling have cylindrical paper-wrapped pellets, 1-15/16in. in length and diameter.





SD2 Anti-Personnel 'Butterfly Bomb'

Bomb Weight	Approx. 2kg (4.41lb)
Explosive Weight	Approx. 7.5oz (225 grams) of Amatol surrounded by a layer of bituminous composition.
Fuze Type	41 fuze (time) , 67 fuze (clockwork time delay) or 70 fuze (anti-handling device)
Body Diameter	3in (7.62 cm) diameter, 3.1in (7.874) long
Use	Designed as an anti-personnel/fragmentation weapon. They were delivered by air, being dropped in containers of 23-144 sub-munitions that opened at a predetermined height, thus scattering the bombs.
Remarks	Quite rare. First used against Ipswich in 1940, but were also dropped on Kingston upon Hull, Grimsby and Cleethorpes in June 1943, amongst various other targets in UK. As the bombs fell the outer case flicked open via springs which caused four light metal drogues with a protruding 5 inch steel cable to deploy in the form of a parachute & wind vane, which armed the device as it span.



Parachute Mine (Luftmine B / LMB)

Bomb Weight	Approx. 990kg (2176lb)
Explosive Weight	Approx. 705kg (1,554lb)
Fuze Type	Impact/time delay/hydrostatic pressure fuze
Dimensions	2.64m x 0.64m (3.04m with parachute housing)
Use	Against civilian, military and industrial targets. Used as blast bombs and designed to detonate above ground level to maximise damage to a wider area.
Remarks	Deployed a parachute when dropped in order to control its descent. Had the potential to cause extensive damage within a 100m radius.





SC 1000kg High Explosive Bomb

Bomb Weight	Approx. 993-1027kg (2,189-2,264lb)
Explosive Weight	Approx. 530-620kg (1168-1367lb)
Fuze Type	Electrical impact/mechanical time delay fuze.
Filling	Mixture of 40% amatol and 60% TNT, but when used as an anti-shipping bomb it was filled with Trialen 105, a mixture of 15% RDX, 70% TNT and 15% aluminium powder.
Bomb Dimensions	2800 x 654mm (110 x 25.8in)
Body Diameter	654mm (18.5in)
Use	SC-type bombs were General Purpose Bombs used primarily for general demolition work. Constructed of parallel walls with comparatively heavy noses, they are usually of three-piece welded construction.



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Client: Concept Engineering Consultants Ltd

Project: Thorney Lane, Iver

Ref: DA20371-00

Source: Various sources

1kg Incendiary Bomb

Bomb Weight	Approx. 1.0 - 1.3kg (2.2 and 2.9lb)
Explosive Weight	Approx. 680g (1.5lb) Thermite 8-15gm Explosive Nitropenta
Fuze Type	Impact fuze
Bomb Dimensions	350 x 50mm (13.8 x 1.97in)
Body Diameter	50mm (1.97in)
Use	As incendiary – dropped in clusters on towns and industrial complexes.
Remarks	Magnesium alloy case. Sometimes fitted with high explosive charge. The body is a cylindrical alloy casting threaded internally at the nose to receive the fuze holder and fuze.





C50 A Incendiary Bomb

Bomb Weight	Approx. 41kg (90.4lb)
Explosive Weight	Approx. 0.03kg (0.066lb)
Incendiary Filling	12kg (25.5lb) liquid filling with phosphor igniters in glass phials. Benzine 85%; Phosphorus 4%; Pure Rubber 10%
Fuze Type	Electrical impact fuze
Bomb Dimensions	1,100 x 280mm (43.2 x 8in)
Use	Against any targets where an incendiary effect is required.
Remarks	Early fill was a phosphorous/carbon disulphide incendiary mixture.





Flam C-250 Oil Bomb

Bomb Weight	480-520kg (1,058-1,146lb)
Explosive Weight	250-260kg (551-573lb)
Fuze Type	Electrical impact/mechanical time delay fuze
Bomb Dimensions	1957 x 640mm (77 x 25.2in)
Body Diameter	470mm (18.5in)
Use	Against fixed airfield installations, hangars, assembly halls, flyovers, underpasses, high-rise buildings and below-ground installations.
Remarks	40/60 or 50/50 Amatol TNT, Trialene. Bombs recovered with Trialen filling have cylindrical paper-wrapped pellets, 1-15/16in. in length and diameter.



3.7 Inch QF Anti-Aircraft Projectile

Projectile Weight	28lb (12.6 kg)
Explosive Weight	2.52lbs
Fuze Type	Mechanical Time Fuze
Dimensions	3.7in x 14.7in (94mm x 360mm)
Rate of Fire	10 to 20 rounds per minute
Use	The 3.7in AA Mks 1-3 were the standard Heavy Anti-Aircraft guns of the British Army and were commonly used on the Home Front.
Ceiling	30,000ft to 59,000ft



40mm Bofors Projectile

Projectile Weight	1.96lb (0.86kg)
Explosive Weight	300g (0.6lb)
Fuze Type	Impact Fuze
Rate of Fire	120 rounds per minute
Projectile Dimensions	40 x 180mm
Ceiling	23,000ft (7000m)
Remarks	Light quick fire high explosive anti-aircraft projectile. Each projectile fitted with small tracer element. If no target hit, shell would explode when tracer burnt out. Designed to engage aircraft flying below 2,000ft.



3in Unrotated Projectile (UP) Anti-Aircraft Rocket ("Z" Battery)

HE Projectile Weight	3.4kg (7.6lb)
Explosive Weight	0.96kg (2.13lb)
Filling	High Explosive – TNT. Fitted with aerial burst fuzing
Dimensions of projectile	236 x 83mm (9.29 x 3.25in)
Remarks	As a short range rocket-firing anti-aircraft weapon developed for the Royal Navy. It was used extensively by British ships during the early days of World War II. The UP was also used in ground-based single and 128-round launchers known as Z Batteries. Shell consists of a steel cylinder reduced in diameter at the base and threaded externally to screw into the shell ring of the rocket motor.



1st Line Defence

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