

4 Square Engineering Consultancy Limited

HAZOP Study for the Refrigerant Transfer Package

Report provided for: GAP Group

Document No:	4SQ_IMBNZ_284_16_01_Rev_A
Issued:	08/06/22

Prepared by:

..... William Rose, Director

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Recommendations detailed within this document are provided as examples of potential solutions or risk reduction measures. The recommendations are neither prescriptive, nor exhaustive and other alternative actions may be appropriate. The application of any such recommendations is the responsibility of the client.

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1.0 SUMMARY

This Refrigerant Transfer Package HAZOP study was carried out to assess the potential hazards and operability issues associated with the operation of the new transfer package being installed.

The HAZOP study generated twelve recommendations for further analysis or additional control & mitigation measures.

Where possible, each identified cause / consequence scenario was allocated a likelihood and severity value to ascertain the perceived risk level present. The risk criteria adopted for the purposes of prioritising and measuring risk is detailed in this document.

The HAZOP study was held on Friday 6th May 2022.

2.0 INTRODUCTION

2.1 GAP Gateshead Refrigerant Transfer Package

The new package is designed to transfer the refrigerant contents of 1-tonne "bombs" into an isotanker. The tanker has a volume of approximately 22m³. The intended operation of the system is to decant twenty bombs and then transport the tanker elsewhere for recycling.

2.2 HAZOP Scope

The HAZOP study examined the potential hazards associated with the operation of the transfer package.

2.3 HAZOP Study Format

The HAZOP was carried out and recorded using a proprietary HAZOP software package (PHA Pro 8). The worksheets produced from this package are included below. This is in tabular form and records the hazards, deviations, safeguards and recommendations noted during the formal assessment session.

3.0 HAZOP RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations	Place(s) Used	Maximum Current Risk Ranking	Responsibili ty	Due Date
1. Confirm hoses are fitted with valves at the end to minimise volume of gas released at each operation.	Consequences: 1.13.1.1, 2.11.1.1, 3.13.1.1, 3.14.2.1	R		
2. Confirm how pump startup is to be controlled in practice.	Consequences: 1.13.2.1, 2.11.2.1	С		
3. Complete DSEAR review.	Consequences: 1.14.1.1, 2.12.1.1	R		
4. Consider installation of weigh scales to confirm cylinder is being emptied.	Consequences: 2.4.1.1, 2.4.1.2, 2.7.1.1, 2.7.2.1, 2.7.3.1	С		
5. Confirm maximum physical head pressure capability of pump / motor set.	Consequences: 2.5.1.1, 2.5.2.1	R		
6. Confirm SIL rating / requirement of high pressure trip safety instrumented system.	Consequences: 2.5.2.1	R		
7. Confirm contents of "empty" iso-tanks when delivered.	Consequences: 2.6.1.1	С		
 Confirm only CompEx-trained personnel will carry out intrusive maintenance / inspection on ATEX- certified equipment. 	Consequences: 2.6.1.2	R		
9. Confirm scales are ATEX-certified.	Consequences: 2.7.1.1, 2.7.2.1, 2.7.3.1	С		
10. Consider installation of excess flow valves in system to protect against full bore release from equipment / hose failure.	Consequences: 2.9.1.1, 3.11.1.1	R		
11. Confirm tank is fitted with level instrumentation and associated pump trip interlock.	Consequences: 3.7.1.1	R		
12. Confirm isotank will be connected to plant earthing system prior to fluid flow occurring.	Consequences: 3.14.2.1	R		

4.0 HAZOP ADMINISTRATION

4.1 Team Members

First Name	Last Name	Title	Company/Depart ment
William	Rose	HAZOP Facilitator	4 Square Engineering
Matthew	Cullen	Graduate Process Safety Engineer	4 Square Engineering
lan	Bell	Process Engineer	IMBNZ
William	Nicholson	Mechanical Engineer	IMBNZ
Andy	Wiltshire	Director	GAP-Ice
Peter	Young	Director	GAP-Ice
Garry	Harbottle	Director	GAP-Ice

4.2 Drawings

Document Number	Rev.	Place(s) Used
IMB-PID-001-A1	A1	Nodes: 1, 2, 3

5.0 HAZOP STUDY DATA

5.1 HAZOP Nodes

Nadaa	Time	Design	Drowings / Peferonese		Equipment	Commont
Nodes	туре	Conditions/Parameters	Drawings / References	Tag	Description	Comment
1. Cylinder discharge / pump suction	Drum	Cylinder pressure (Freon):	IMB-PID-001-A1			
	Line	Cylinder pressure (Pentane				
	Vessel	only): Atmospheric pressure				
2. Multi-phase double screw pump & discharge	Line	Isotank arrives with OBarg,	IMB-PID-001-A1			
inte	Compressor	Compressor will charge tank to 10Barg. (Design pressure				
	Compressor (Positive Displacement) Pumps (Positive Displacement)	27.5Barg). Operates at ambient temperature. Max 5m3/hr (liquid). Expected transfer time 28minutes maximum. Expected one cylinder / day.				
3. ISO tank	Line Tank Tanker Vessel	Isotank arrives with OBarg, Design pressure 27.5Barg. Operates at ambient temperature. Rupture disc: 30.36Barg	IMB-PID-001-A1			
		20 days.				

5.2 HAZOP Deviations

Node: 1. Cylinder discharge / pump suction

Drawings / References: IMB-PID-001-A1

Design Conditions/Parameters: Cylinder pressure (Freon): 7Barg (full) to 0Barg.

Deviations	Guide Word	Parameter	Comments
1. Contamination	As well as	Composition	
2. High Flow	High	Flow	
3. Low/No Flow	Low/No	Flow	
4. Reverse/Misdirected Flow	Reverse/Misdirected	Flow	
5. High Pressure	High	Pressure	
6. Low Pressure	Low	Pressure	
7. High Level	High	Level	
8. Low Level	Low	Level	
9. High Temperature	High	Temperature	
10. Low Temperature	Low	Temperature	
11. Leak	As well as	Flow	
12. Rupture	Other than	Flow	
13. Start-up/Shutdown Hazards	Other than	Start-up / shutdown	
14. Maintenance / Operational Hazards	Other than	Maintenance / operations	

Node: 2. Multi-phase double screw pump & discharge line

Drawings / References: IMB-PID-001-A1

Deviations	Guide Word	Parameter	Comments
1. Contamination (foreign objects / debris)	As well as	Composition	
2. High Flow	High	Flow	
3. Low/No Flow	Low/No	Flow	
4. Reverse/Misdirected Flow	Reverse/Misdirected	Flow	
5. High Pressure	High	Pressure	
6. Low Pressure	Low	Pressure	
7. High Temperature	High	Temperature	
8. Low Temperature	Low	Temperature	
9. Leak	As well as	Flow	
10. Rupture	Other than	Flow	
11. Start-up/Shutdown Hazards	Other than	Start-up / shutdown	
12. Maintenance / Operational Hazards	Other than	Maintenance / operations	

Node: 3. ISO tank.

Drawings / References: IMB-PID-001-A1

Design Conditions/Parameters: Isotank arrives with OBarg,

Design pressure 27.5Barg.

Operates at ambient temperature.

Rupture disc: 30.36Barg

Deviations	Guide Word	Parameter	Comments
1. Contamination	As well as	Composition	
2. High Flow	High	Flow	
3. Low/No Flow	Low/No	Flow	
4. Reverse/Misdirected Flow	Reverse/Misdirected	Flow	
5. High Pressure	High	Pressure	
6. Low Pressure	Low	Pressure	
7. High Level	High	Level	
8. Low Level	Low	Level	
9. High Temperature	High	Temperature	
10. Low Temperature	Low	Temperature	
11. Leak	As well as	Flow	
12. Rupture	Other than	Flow	
13. Start-up/Shutdown Hazards	Other than	Start-up / shutdown	
14. Maintenance / Operational Hazards	Other than	Maintenance / operations	

5.3 HAZOP Study Worksheets

5.3.1 Node: 1. Cylinder discharge / pump suction Drawings / References: IMB-PID-001-A1

Design Conditions/Parameters: Cylinder pressure (Freon): 7Barg (full) to 0Barg.

Deviations	Causes	Consequences	Cons	Cur Ri	Current Risk		Safeguards	Recommendations
			Uat	S	L	RR		
1. Contamination	1. Unexpected gas present (R32)	1. Fire / explosion	BUI				1. Upstream fridge plant process controls	
				5 :	1	R	2. Operating procedures	
							3. Trained / competent personnel	
	2. Water (freezing)	1. Time delay to	BUI				2. Operating procedures	
		operations		1	3	С	3. Trained / competent personnel	
							4. Trace heating on hoses between cylinder and pump	
2. High Flow	1. None							
3. Low/No Flow	1. Blockage (foreign	1. Time delay to	BUI				2. Operating procedures	
	freezing)						3. Trained / competent personnel	
				1	3	С	4. Trace heating on hoses between cylinder and pump	
							5. Upstream fridge plant filtration	
							16. Sight glass fitted to top of vertical leg	
		2. Pump damage	AST				2. Operating procedures	
				1	2	А	3. Trained / competent personnel	
							6. Pump specified to be able to run dry	

Design Conditions/Parameters: Cylinder pressure (Freon): 7Barg (full) to 0Barg.

Deviations	Causes	Consequences	Cons	Current Risk		C Cons Cat		Cu Cons F		Cu Cons I Cat		Cu ons f		ent K	Safeguards	Recommendations
			Cat	S	L	RR										
							 NRV on suction / discharge pipe work to maintain primed configuration 									
							15. Continuous column of pentane fluid on discharge line									
							16. Sight glass fitted to top of vertical leg									
	2. Operator error (closed	1. Time delay to	BUI				2. Operating procedures									
	valves)	operations		1			3. Trained / competent personnel									
					3	С	5. Upstream fridge plant filtration									
							16. Sight glass fitted to top of vertical leg									
		2. Pump damage	AST				2. Operating procedures									
							3. Trained / competent personnel									
							6. Pump specified to be able to run dry									
				1	2	A	 NRV on suction / discharge pipe work to maintain primed configuration 									
							15. Continuous column of pentane fluid on discharge line									
							16. Sight glass fitted to top of vertical leg									

Design Conditions/Parameters: Cylinder pressure (Freon): 7Barg (full) to 0Barg.

Deviations	Causes	Consequences	Cons	С	Current Risk		Safeguards	Recommendations
			ναι	S	L	RR		
4. Reverse/Misdirected Flow	1. None							
5. High Pressure	1. Unexpected gas present (R32)	1. Fire / explosion	PER				1. Upstream fridge plant process controls	
				5	1	R	2. Operating procedures	
							3. Trained / competent personnel	
6. Low Pressure	1. Pentane only in cylinder (Vapour pressure ~0,5Bara)	1. None	BUI	1	4	R		
7. High Level	1. None							
8. Low Level	1. None							
9. High Temperature	1. None							
10. Low Temperature	1. Blockage (water	1. Time delay to	BUI				2. Operating procedures	
	ineezing)	operations		1	3	с	3. Trained / competent personnel	
							 Trace heating on hoses between cylinder and pump 	
		2. Pump damage	AST				2. Operating procedures	
				1	2	A	3. Trained / competent personnel	
							Pump specified to be able to run dry	
11. Leak	1. Equipment failure /	1. Fire / explosion	PER	5	1	R	3. Trained / competent personnel	
					-		2. Operating procedures	

Design Conditions/Parameters: Cylinder pressure (Freon): 7Barg (full) to 0Barg.

Deviations	Causes	Consequences	Cons Cat	C	Current Risk		Safeguards	Recommendations
				S	L	RR		
							8. Equipment design / specification	
							9. Periodic inspection / maintenance	
							10. Continuously supervised operation	
							11. ATEX-certified equipment (Z1, IIA, T3)	
							12. Outdoors location - freely ventilated	
13. Start-up/Shutdown Hazards	1. Connection /	1. Fire / explosion	PER				3. Trained / competent personnel	1. Confirm hoses are fitted with valves at the end to
	(leaks)						2. Operating procedures	operation.
							8. Equipment design / specification	
				5	1	R	9. Periodic inspection / maintenance	
				5	1		10. Continuously supervised operation	
							11. ATEX-certified equipment (Z1, IIA, T3)	
							12. Outdoors location - freely ventilated	
	2. Pump speed control on	1. Equipment damage	AST	1	2	0	3. Trained / competent personnel	2. Confirm how pump startup is to be controlled in
	start up			T	3		2. Operating procedures	practice.

Design Conditions/Parameters: Cylinder pressure (Freon): 7Barg (full) to 0Barg.

Deviations	Causes	Consequences	Cons Cat	C	Curre Ris	ent k	Safeguards	Recommendations
				S L RR		RR		
14. Maintenance / Operational	1. Maintenance between	1. Fire / explosion	PER				2. Operating procedures	3. Complete DSEAR review.
nazarus	operations only					3. Trained / competent personnel		
							11. ATEX-certified equipment (Z1, IIA, T3)	
				5	1	R	13. Planned preventative maintenance schedule in place (PPM)	
							 Safe system of work in place for intrusive maintenance (draining / purging) 	

Deviations	Causes	Consequences	Cons Cat	C	Current Risk		Safeguards	Recommendations
				S	L	RR		
1. Contamination (foreign	1. Water (freezing)	1. Time delay to operations	BUI				2. Operating procedures	
objects / debris)				1	3	с	3. Trained / competent personnel	
							4. Trace heating on hoses between cylinder and pump	
	2. Poor operating practice	1. Time delay to	BUI				2. Operating procedures	
	during conenction / disconnection)	operations		1	3	с	3. Trained / competent personnel	
							4. Trace heating on hoses between cylinder and pump	
		2. Equipment damage	AST	1	2		2. Operating procedures	
						A	3. Trained / competent personnel	
2. High Flow	1. None							
3. Low/No Flow	1. Blockage (foreign	1. Time delay to	BUI				2. Operating procedures	
	freezing)	operations		1	3	с	3. Trained / competent personnel	
							4. Trace heating on hoses between cylinder and pump	

Deviations	Causes	Consequences	Cons	C	Current Risk		Safeguards	Recommendations
			oat	S	L	RR		
							5. Upstream fridge plant filtration	
							16. Sight glass fitted to top of vertical leg	
		2. Pump damage	AST				2. Operating procedures	
							3. Trained / competent personnel	
							6. Pump specified to be able to run dry	
				1	2	A	 NRV on suction / discharge pipe work to maintain primed configuration 	
							15. Continuous column of pentane fluid on discharge line	
							16. Sight glass fitted to top of vertical leg	
	2. Operator error (closed	1. Time delay to	BUI				2. Operating procedures	
	valves)	υρειατιστισ		1	3	С	3. Trained / competent personnel	
							5. Upstream fridge plant filtration	

Deviations	Causes	Consequences	Cons	С	Current Risk		Safeguards	Recommendations
			Ual	s	L	RR		
							16. Sight glass fitted to top of vertical leg	
		2. Pump damage	AST				2. Operating procedures	
							3. Trained / competent personnel	
				1	2		6. Pump specified to be able to run dry	
				1	2	A	 NRV on suction / discharge pipe work to maintain primed configuration 	
							16. Sight glass fitted to top of vertical leg	
4. Reverse/Misdirected Flow	1. Operator error (bypass	1. Time delay to	BUI	1	2	C	2. Operating procedures	4. Consider installation of weigh scales to confirm
	valve open)	operations		-			3. Trained / competent personnel	cynnaer is being emplied.
		2. Heat build up /	AST	1	2	Δ	2. Operating procedures	4. Consider installation of weigh scales to confirm
	equipment damage	equipment damage			2		3. Trained / competent personnel	
5. High Pressure		1. Equipment damage	AST	1	2	А	2. Operating procedures	

Deviations	Causes	Consequences	Cons Cat	C	Current Risk		Safeguards	Recommendations
				S	L	RR		
	1. Operator error (closed	Р	PER				3. Trained / competent personnel	5. Confirm maximum physical head pressure
	uscharge valves)						8. Equipment design / specification	capability of pullip / motor set.
			5	1	R	11. ATEX-certified equipment (Z1, IIA, T3)		
							17. Pressure relief valve fitted to tank	
	2. NRV stuck closed	1. Equipment damage	AST	1	2	A	2. Operating procedures	 Confirm maximum physical head pressure capability of pump / motor set.
			PER				3. Trained / competent personnel	6. Confirm SIL rating / requirement of high pressure
							8. Equipment design / specification	uip salety instrumented system.
				5	1	R	11. ATEX-certified equipment (Z1, IIA, T3)	
							17. Pressure relief valve fitted to tank	
							18. Pump high pressure trip (10bar)	
6. Low Pressure			BUI	1	3	С	2. Operating procedures	

Deviations	Causes	Consequences	Cons	С	Current Risk		Safeguards	Recommendations
			Uat	S	L	RR		
	1. Equipment containment failure	1. Time delay to operations					3. Trained / competent personnel	 Confirm contents of "empty" iso-tanks when delivered.
		2. Fire / explosion	AST	1	2	A	2. Operating procedures	8. Confirm only CompEx-trained personnel will carry
			PER				3. Trained / competent personnel	certified equipment.
							8. Equipment design / specification	
				5	1	R	11. ATEX-certified equipment (Z1, IIA, T3)	
							17. Pressure relief valve fitted to tank	
	2. Operator error (suction	1. Time delay to	BUI	1	n	C	2. Operating procedures	
	valves closed)	operations		-	5	U	3. Trained / competent personnel	
7. High Temperature	1. Operator error (closed discharge valves)	1. Time delay to operations	BUI				2. Operating procedures	 Consider installation of weigh scales to confirm cylinder is being emptied.
				1	3	С	3. Trained / competent personnel	9. Confirm scales are ATEX-certified.
							4. Trace heating on hoses between cylinder and pump	

Deviations	Causes	Consequences	Cons	С	Curren Risk		Safeguards	Recommendations
			υαι	S	L	RR		
							5. Upstream fridge plant filtration	
							16. Sight glass fitted to top of vertical leg	
							15. Continuous column of pentane fluid on discharge line	
		2. Pump damage	AST				2. Operating procedures	
							3. Trained / competent personnel	
							 Pump specified to be able to run dry 	
				1	2	A	 NRV on suction / discharge pipe work to maintain primed configuration 	
							15. Continuous column of pentane fluid on discharge line	
							16. Sight glass fitted to top of vertical leg	
			BUI	1	3	С	2. Operating procedures	9. Confirm scales are ATEX-certified.

Deviations	Causes	Consequences	Cons Cat	С	Current Risk		Safeguards	Recommendations
			oat	S	L	RR		
	2. Equipment failure (no	1. Time delay to					3. Trained / competent personnel	4. Consider installation of weigh scales to confirm
						4. Trace heating on hoses between cylinder and pump	cymuch is being emption.	
							5. Upstream fridge plant filtration	
							16. Sight glass fitted to top of vertical leg	
							15. Continuous column of pentane fluid on discharge line	
		2. Pump damage	AST				2. Operating procedures	
							3. Trained / competent personnel	
				1	2	Δ	6. Pump specified to be able to run dry	
				1	2		 NRV on suction / discharge pipe work to maintain primed configuration 	
							15. Continuous column of pentane fluid on discharge line	

Deviations	Causes	Consequences	Cons	С	Current Risk		Safeguards	Recommendations			
			Ual	s	L	RR					
							16. Sight glass fitted to top of vertical leg				
	 Blockage (foreign objects / debris / water freezing) 	1. Time delay to operations	BUI				2. Operating procedures	 Consider installation of weigh scales to confirm cylinder is being emptied. 			
	neezing/						3. Trained / competent personnel	9. Confirm scales are ATEX-certified.			
				1	3	с	4. Trace heating on hoses between cylinder and pump				
							5. Upstream fridge plant filtration				
							16. Sight glass fitted to top of vertical leg				
		2. Pump damage	AST				2. Operating procedures				
							3. Trained / competent personnel				
				1	2	A	6. Pump specified to be able to run dry				
							7. NRV on suction / discharge pipe work to maintain primed configuration				

Deviations	Causes	Consequences	Cons	C	Current Risk		Safeguards	Recommendations		
			Cat	s	L	RR				
							15. Continuous column of pentane fluid on discharge line			
							16. Sight glass fitted to top of vertical leg			
8. Low Temperature	1. None									
9. Leak 1. Equipment failure / 1. Fire / explosion operator error	PER				3. Trained / competent personnel	10. Consider installation of excess flow valves in				
	operator error						2. Operating procedures equipment / hose failure.			
							8. Equipment design / specification			
				5	1	P	9. Periodic inspection / maintenance	_		
					-		10. Continuously supervised operation			
						11. ATEX-certified equipment (Z1, IIA, T3)				
							12. Outdoors location - freely ventilated			
11. Start-up/Shutdown Hazards	;	1. Fire / explosion	PER	5	1	R	3. Trained / competent personnel			

Deviations	Causes	Consequences	Cons Cat	С	Current Risk		Safeguards	Recommendations
				S	L	RR		
	1. Connection /						2. Operating procedures	1. Confirm hoses are fitted with valves at the end to
	(leaks)						8. Equipment design / specification	operation.
							9. Periodic inspection / maintenance	
							10. Continuously supervised operation	
							11. ATEX-certified equipment (Z1, IIA, T3)	
							12. Outdoors location - freely ventilated	
	2. Pump speed control on	1. Equipment damage	AST	1	3	C	3. Trained / competent personnel	2. Confirm how pump startup is to be controlled in
	start up			-	5	U	2. Operating procedures	- practice.
12. Maintenance / Operational	1. Maintenance between	1. Fire / explosion	PER				2. Operating procedures	3. Complete DSEAR review.
Hazards	operations only			5	1	R	3. Trained / competent personnel	
							11. ATEX-certified equipment (Z1, IIA, T3)	

Deviations	Causes	Consequences	Cons Cat	Curren Risk		nt (Safeguards	Recommendations
			out	s	L	RR		
							 13. Planned preventative maintenance schedule in place (PPM) 14. Safe system of work in place for intrusive maintenance (draining / purging) 	

Drawings / References: IMB-PID-001-A1

Design Conditions/Parameters: Isotank arrives with OBarg,

Design pressure 27.5Barg.

Operates at ambient temperature.

Rupture disc: 30.36Barg

Deviations	Causes	Consequences	Cons Cat	C	Current Risk		Safeguards	Recommendations
1. Contamination	1. Unexpected gas present (R32)	1. Fire / explosion	BUI		-		1. Upstream fridge plant process controls	
				5	1	R	2. Operating procedures	
							3. Trained / competent personnel	
2. High Flow	1. None							
3. Low/No Flow	1. None							
4. Reverse/Misdirected Flow	1. None							
5. High Pressure	1. Unexpected gas present (R32)	1. Fire / explosion (operation of PRV / BD)	BUI				1. Upstream fridge plant process controls	
							2. Operating procedures	
				5	1	R	3. Trained / competent personnel	
							11. ATEX-certified equipment (Z1, IIA, T3)	
							12. Outdoors location - freely ventilated	
6. Low Pressure	1. Equipment failure	1. Time delay to	BUI				2. Operating procedures	
	(PRV/BD)	operations		1	3	с	3. Trained / competent personnel	
							19. Pump discharge pressure monitoring (manual)	

Drawings / References: IMB-PID-001-A1

Design Conditions/Parameters: Isotank arrives with OBarg,

Design pressure 27.5Barg.

Operates at ambient temperature.

Rupture disc: 30.36Barg

Deviations	Causes	Consequences	Cons Cat	Curren Cons Risk Cat		nt	Safeguards	Recommendations	
				S	L	RR			
							20. Iso tank fitted with pressure guage		
7. High Level	1. Operator error	1. Fire / explosion (operation of PRV / BD)	BUI				1. Upstream fridge plant process controls	11. Confirm tank is fitted with level instrumentation and associated pump trip interlock.	
							2. Operating procedures		
5 1	1	R	3. Trained / competent personnel						
						11. ATEX-certified equipment (Z1, IIA, T3)			
							12. Outdoors location - freely ventilated		
8. Low Level	1. None								
9. High Temperature	1. None								
10. Low Temperature	1. None								
11. Leak	1. Equipment failure /	1. Fire / explosion	PER				3. Trained / competent personnel	10. Consider installation of excess flow valves in	
	operator error						2. Operating procedures	equipment / hose failure.	
	5	1	R	8. Equipment design / specification					
							9. Periodic inspection / maintenance		

Drawings / References: IMB-PID-001-A1

Design Conditions/Parameters: Isotank arrives with OBarg,

Design pressure 27.5Barg.

Operates at ambient temperature.

Rupture disc: 30.36Barg

Deviations	Causes	Consequences	Cons Cat	Current Risk		ent K	Safeguards	Recommendations
			- Cat	S	L	RF	2	
							10. Continuously supervised operation	
					11. ATEX-certified equipment (Z1, IIA, T3)			
					12. Outdoors location - freely ventilated			
13. Start-up/Shutdown Hazards	1. Connection /	1. Fire / explosion	PER				3. Trained / competent personnel	1. Confirm hoses are fitted with valves at the end to
	(leaks)						2. Operating procedures	operation.
							8. Equipment design / specification	
				_	1	Б	9. Periodic inspection / maintenance	
				5			10. Continuously supervised operation	
							11. ATEX-certified equipment (Z1, IIA, T3)	
					12. Outdoors location - freely ventilated			
	1. Statutory inspections	1. Fire / explosion	PER	5	1	R	21. Completed by off-site specialists	

Drawings / References: IMB-PID-001-A1

Design Conditions/Parameters: Isotank arrives with OBarg,

Design pressure 27.5Barg.

Operates at ambient temperature.

Rupture disc: 30.36Barg

Deviations	Causes	Consequences	Cons Cat	Current Risk		nt ‹	Safeguards	Recommendations	
			out	S	L	RR			
14. Maintenance / Operational Hazards	2. Tank earthing (electrostatic discharge)	1. Fire / explosion	PER				3. Trained / competent personnel	 Confirm hoses are fitted with valves at the end to minimise volume of gas released at each operation. 	
							2. Operating procedures	12. Confirm isotank will be connected to plant	
							8. Equipment design / specification	earthing system profito huid now occurring.	
				5	1	R	9. Periodic inspection / maintenance		
							10. Continuously supervised operation		
							11. ATEX-certified equipment (Z1, IIA, T3)		
							12. Outdoors location - freely ventilated		

6.0 HAZOP STUDY OVERVIEW

Number of Study Items:

Nodes: 3 Causes: 48	Devi Con:	iations: 40 sequences: 46			
Unique Safeguards: 21	Rec	ommendations: 12			
Nada			Number of Study Items	;	
Noae	Deviations	Causes	Consequences	Safeguards	Recommendations
1. Cylinder discharge / pump suction	14	16	14	16	3
2. Multi-phase double screw pump & discharge line	12	18	24	17	17
3. ISO tank	14	14	8	11	5

Risk Heat Map

Severity		Likelihood								
Ocventy	5	4	3	2	1					
5	0	0	0	0	18					
4	0	0	0	0	0					
3	0	0	0	0	0					
2	0	0	0	0	0					
1	0	1	17	13	0					



HAZOP RISK CRITERIA

				Likelihood							
Severity	Personnel	Environment	Asset / Property	Business Interruption	Media	Public	5	4	3	2	1
5	Multiple fatalities	Extensive, persistent or irreversible damage to ecosystem function - public affected	Total or extensive damage to on-site equipment requiring complete replacement and significant (in excess of £1M). Extensive damage to off-site property (in excess of £300k) Dwelling(s) off-site damage and uninhabitable	Disruption to dependent operations for more than 1 year	International media attention. Severe adverse public reaction threatening facility operations.	Single fatality	U	U	U	ND	R
4	Single fatality	Significant loss of containment resulting in widespread moderate- long term ecosystem damage - external help required - public not affected.	Major damage to onsite equipment repaired within 4 to 12 months. requiring significant capital expenditure (£300k to £1M) Major damage to offsite property (up to £300k) Dwelling off-site damage and uninhabitable	Disruption to dependent operations for 3 to 12 months	National media attention Moderate public concern / reaction	Multiple injury - Impairment to several persons. Hospitalization > 24 hrs. Delayed recovery	U	U	ND	ND	R
3	Multiple injury - impairment to several persions. Hospitalization > 24 hrs. Delayed recovery	Significant loss of containment resulting in short term damage imparing local ecosystem - no external help required - public not affected	On-site equipment damage repaired within 7 to 120 days with loss of production, requiring capitial expenditure (£100k to £300k)	Disruption to dependent operations for 7 to 90 days	State media attention. Adverse public reaction	Medical treatment injury with rapid recovery. Hospitalization < 24 hrs	ND	ND	R	R	С
2	Medical treatment injury with rapid recovery. Hospitalization < 24 hrs	Insignificant loss of conatinment resulting in minor biological effects across limited area onsite	On-site damage repaired within 7 days with loss of production, requiring capital expenditure (£30k to £100k)	Disruption to dependent operations for less than 7 days	Local media attention. Possible adverse public reaction	First aid treatment	ND	R	R	с	A
1	First aid treatment	On-site release immediately contained and readily cleaned up with onsite or locally available technology	On-site equipment damage repaired within 24 hours, without loss of production, requiring capital expenditure (less than £30k)	Disruption to dependent operations for less than one day	No effect	No effect	R	R	С	A	A

Risk Ranking

Risk Ranking	Description
U	UNACCEPTABLE: Risk cannot be tolerated or justified unless there are exceptional reasons for the activity to take place. Control measures to be introduced to drive risk downward.
ND	NOT DESIRABLE: Risk may be tolerated but shall only be accepted when risk reduction is impracticable and when authorised by a senior manager.
R	ACCEPTABLE WITH REVIEW: Must be reviewed to ensure risk is ALARP - additional measures may be required.
С	ACCEPTABLE WITH CONTROLS: Adequate risk control measures are in place.
A	ACCEPTABLE: No additional risk control measures are needed.

Likelihood

Likelihood	Description
5	Likely to be experienced every time or frequently
4	Likely to be experienced annually or more often
3	Unlikely, but reasonably expected to occur sometimes in the life of an item
2	Unlikely to be experienced, but credible to occur in the life of an item
1	Extremely unlikely to be experienced but not physically impossible