Esholt Sludge Treatment Facility: Accident Management Plan





Document Control

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Document Approval

Name	Name
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Policy and Assurance	
Document Owner (Author)	Document Approval Manager (Tier 3)

Document Revision History

Version	Date	Revised By	Reviewed By	Amendment Details
1	21/10/2024	David Shaw	Hazel Morgan	New document

Business areas affected by this document

This applies to colleagues that are operating or managing Esholt STF.

1. Introduction

In accordance with the Environmental Permit for Esholt Sludge Treatment Facility (STF) (permit reference: EPR/DP3092ZJ), this document presents the Accident Management Plan for the permitted facility.

This plan is established to identify, evaluate, and prepare for potential incidents or events that could result in:

- Pollution; and / or
- not being able to comply with permit conditions.

This plan for accident prevention and management follows relevant Environment Agency guidance and includes the following sections:

- Overview of management controls (Section 2)
- Identification of relevant sensitive receptors (Section 3).
- Identification of potentially polluting substances held on site (Section 4).
- Identification potential accidents and incidents and assessment of the overall risk posed by these hazards (Section 5).
- The overall risk of each of the hazard is identified on the basis of the likelihood of the event occurring and the environmental consequence of that event, taking account of:
 - Preventive controls in place; and
 - Actions to be taken in the event of the accident / incident occurring.
- Summary of actions to be taken following an accident or incident occurring, including measures to record, investigate and respond to the incident (Section 6).
- List of emergency contacts (Section 7).

2. Overview of relevant management controls and procedures

YW has an established EMS, which is certified to the ISO 14001 standard. The EMS forms part of a wider corporate Integrated Management System (IMS) which also incorporates quality management, health and safety management, asset management, organisational resilience, and business continuity requirements. The management system follows an asset life cycle approach, from design through to decommissioning. Corporate level management system processes are in place, which are supplemented by site-specific documented procedures and processes.

YW has developed processes to identify, respond to and control emergency situations that may cause adverse environmental consequences. Spill kits are readily accessible at locations where there is a risk of spillage (e.g. delivery, storage, and areas of use). Spill control toolbox talks are provided to staff. This includes information about how to prevent and control pollution incidents from accidental spills of oils, fuels, sludge, and chemicals. Contingency plans help minimise potential environmental impacts; this includes emergencies arising from breakdowns, enforced shutdowns, abnormal circumstances such as flooding as well as major fire and spill/loss of containment events.

The YW Business Continuity Plan is in place to define and prioritise critical business functions, details the immediate response requirements for a critical incident and details strategies and actions to be taken to ensure business continuity. All Bioresources sites, including Esholt STF, have the capability of remote monitoring and remote operation of key functions. A security guard is present on site 12 hours per day Monday to Friday and CCTV security cameras are located across the site with monitoring provided 24/7 by the YW Service Delivery Centre. All buildings are alarmed, and high-risk equipment is provided with secondary fencing for added security.

3. Sensitive receptors

A summary of sensitive receptors relevant to Esholt STF is provided in Table 1 below.

Receptor type	Receptor description and distance
Human	
Residential housing – North	Digester area: Nearest residential properties located approximately
	160m to the north (adjacent to Esholt Hall).
	Digested sludge area: Nearest residential property located
	approximately 450m to the north.
Residential housing – East	Digester area: Nearest residential property located approximately
	315m to the northeast and 900m to the southeast.
	Digested sludge area: Nearest residential property located
	approximately 450m to the east.
Residential housing –	Digester area: Nearest residential property located approximately
South	820m to the south.
	Digested sludge area: Nearest residential property located
	approximately 450m to the south.
Residential housing – West	Digester area: Nearest residential property located approximately
	650m to the southwest.
	Digested sludge area: Nearest residential property located
	approximately 770m to the west.
Public amenity areas	National Cycle Network route crosses YW land directly to the West, but
including public footpath /	outside of, the installation boundary. The surrounding land use is
cycleway	generally wooded, with footpaths and is likely to provide local
	ecological and amenity interest.
Schools	There are 10 schools within approximately 2km of the site, and 2 sites
	within 1km. The nearest of these is 785m to the southeast of the
	digested sludge area.
Hospitals	There is one hospital located approximately 2km to the southwest of
	There are no hospitals within 2 km of the site. There is 1 hospital
	approximately 5 km from the site.
Industrial/commercial sites	YW-owned Esholt Hall is located approximately 140m to the northeast
	of the digester area.

Table 1: Sensitive Receptors to site

	Home Farm Industrial Park (comprising a number of office units) is
	located approximately 315m to the northeast of the digester area.
Ecological	
Habitat sites – statutory	There is one internationally designated site within 10km of the
designations	installation (a SAC/SPA) and one nationally designated site within
	2km; this is a SSSI designated for geological reasons.
Habitat sites – local sites	The surrounding land use is generally wooded, with footpaths and is
and non-statutory	likely to provide local ecological interest.
designations	
Protected species	Possible presence of protected species on or off sites.
Environment – Other	
Global atmosphere	Local, regional, and global atmosphere.
Local atmosphere	Local atmosphere. Site is not located within an AQMA.
Ground/groundwater	Underlying groundwater classed as a Secondary A aquifer;
	groundwater vulnerability classed as medium-high. Groundwater
	source protection zone located 1.2km to the northeast
Surface water	River Aire directly adjacent to installation boundary.
	Likely hydraulic continuity between underlying groundwater and river.

4. Inventory of potentially polluting materials

In assessing potential accidents and incidents consideration has been given to the potentially polluting substances held on site, including review of their properties, toxicity and the volume stored. 0 details the raw materials stored on site, 0 details the sludge, sludge cake and process liquors stored on site and 0 details the waste materials stored on site.

Substance (Contaminants)	Use	State	Storage Arrangements	Toxicity/ Fate/ Mobility
Polymer (powder) and mixed polymer	Coagulant used for raw and digested sludge dewatering	Solid	Raw sludge dewatering: External storage silo (steel, 15 tonne capacity) located on hardstanding. Feeds adjacent mixing tank (GRP, 25 litre capacity). Digested sludge dewatering (sludge export facility): External storage silo (steel, 15 tonne capacity) located on hardstanding. Feeds adjacent mixing tank (GRP, 25 litre capacity). Digested sludge dewatering (conditioning area): 750kg bags stored internally.	Polluting if mobilised to watercourses in the event of a spillage/loss
Polymer (liquid)		Liquid	Use and storage in IBCs within GRP kiosk.	
Polymer (liquid)	Diluted coagulant used for thickening undigested surplus activated sludge (SAS).	Liquid	Liquid polymer is delivered to the SAS thickener building in either 1 m ³ IBCs or via bulk tanker deliveries. Bulk polymer deliveries are transferred into a 10 m ³ bunded GRP bulk storage tank located within the thickener building and from there are transferred to the 3 m ³ bunded GRP polymer prep tank. IBC deliveries directly feed the liquid polymer prep tank. Liquid polymer is diluted with potable water within the 3 m ³ bunded GRP polymer prep tank before being transferred to the adjacent 3 m ³ bunded GRP polymer make up tank. Both the make up and prep tanks are located within a common bund. The polymer solution is injected into the sludge stream before being transferred to thickener drums.	Polluting to soil and watercourses in the event of a spillage/loss

Table 2: Raw Materials Associated with the Facility and their Potential to Pollute (Main app pp.258)

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Substance (Contaminants)	Use	State	Storage Arrangements	Toxicity/ Fate/ Mobility
Antifoam	Digester antifoaming agent	Liquid	IBC (1 m ³) stored on bunded pallet with associated dosing pump and pipework within dosing cabinet.	
Water treatment chemicals	er treatment Boiler treatment		Some storage of small quantities within locked containers in CHP compound. 3 No. 220litre drums stored within specified area in boiler house. Boiler water softener (bagged) stored on pallet within boiler house.	Polluting to soil and watercourses in the event of a spillage/loss
Glycol	Antifreeze for use in CHP equipment	Liquid	2 No.IBC (1 m ³) stored on bunded pallet within locked containers in CHP compound.	
Biogas	Generated and stored within the AD	Gas	Transferred from AD to gas holder for use in the CHP	Volatile and unlikely to pollute watercourses or land in the event of escape
Gas oil	Stand-by boiler fuel	Liquid	Double bunded tank of 108,000litre capacity. Fill point is contained within bunding. Tertiary containment on surrounding hardstanding	
Lubricating oil	For use in CHP and other equipment	Liquid	1m ³ IBC (internal). Small intermediary containers in use for compressor maintenance and stored locally (internal).	Polluting to soil and watercourses in the event of a spillage/loss
Diesel	Fuel for mechanical loaders working on cake pad / barn	Liquid	2,500 litre integrally bunded tank	
Transformer oil	Transformer only	Liquid	No storage other than volume in use	
Propane	Gas oil preheat	Gas	Bottles stored within boiler house and designated storage cage adjacent to the stack	Volatile and unlikely to pollute water courses or land in the event of escape.

Table 3: Bulk Storage of Sludge, Sludge Cake and Process Liquors and their Potential to Pollute

Material	Nature of material	Storage Arrangements	Nominal capacity (m³)	
		Incoming underground pipes from Esholt WwTW	-	
Raw sludge (un- thickened)	Liquid	Sludge screen feed tank, concrete. High level alarms, linked to SCADA	655	

		Consolidation tank 5, construction concrete	2,500
Screened sludge	Liquid	Mixed sludge tanks x 2, concrete construction	1,200 and 1,130
		SAS storage tanks x 2, concrete construction	2,000 each
SAS	Liquid		
		SAS storage tanks x 2, concrete construction	400 each
		THP feed silos x 2, steel construction	210 each
Dewatered sludge	Liquid	THP feed hopper, steel construction	16.2
Dewalered sludge	Liquid	THP vessels x 6, steel construction	22.7 each
		Buffer tank, steel construction	39.5
Sludge within digester	Liquid	Digester tanks x 4, concrete construction, aluminium clad	3,533 each
	Liquid	Degassing tanks x 2, GRP coated concrete	685 each
Digested sludge		Export dewatering feed tanks x 2, steel construction	1,604
		Conditioning dewatering feed tanks x 2, concrete construction	1,200 and 1,130
Sludge transfer	Liquid	Above ground and below ground sludge transfer pipework	-
Dowetaring liquar	Liquid	Centrate pumping stations and associated underground pipework	-
Dewatering liquor	Liquid	Liquor balance tank	800
Run-off / washwater from concrete pad	Liquid	Return pipework (underground, running from southern to northern installation area)	-
Cake		Imported, undigested cake reception unit	30
	Solid	Storage areas (barn and pad)	5,500 tonnes (estimated maximum)
	1		1

Waste Type	Nature of material	Storage Arrangements	Storage and Disposal Method
Sludge screenings	Non-hazardous	Open skip on hardstanding	Collected by approved waste contractor for off-site disposal
Waste oil	Hazardous	Bunded container within bunded containment	Collected by approved waste contractor for off-site disposal
General waste	Non-hazardous	Dedicated skips on hardstanding and gravel areas	Collected by approved waste contractor for off-site disposal
Metals	Non-hazardous	Skip within designated area	Collected by approved waste contractor for off-site disposal
Mixed recycling	Non-hazardous	Skip within designated area	Collected by approved waste contractor for off-site disposal
Wood	Non-hazardous	Skip within designated area	Collected by approved waste contractor for off-site disposal (recycled or treated via EfW)
Empty IBCs	Hazardous	Dedicated area prior to collection	Collected by approved waste contractor for off-site disposal
Oil contaminated absorbents	Hazardous	Dedicated drum containers	Collected by approved waste contractor for off-site disposal

Dedicated drum containers

Table 4: Process Wastes and Potential to Pollute (Main application pp.260)

Hazardous

Oil filters

Collected by approved waste contractor for off-site disposal

5. Accident Management Plan

The potential for accidental releases resulting from the activities proposed in this variation application are identified and assessed in Table 5 below. This includes a summary of measures in place to manage/reduce accident risks. Refer to Appendix 1 for the scoring mechanism.

What harm can be caused and who can be harmed		can be harmed	Managing the risk	Assessing the r	isk (after prevento	ative controls)
Hazard	Receptor	Pathway	Risk management	Probability of exposure	Environmental Consequence	What is the overall risk?
What has the	What is at risk?	How can the	What measures will you take to reduce the risk?	How likely is	What is the	What is the
potential to	What do I wish	hazard get to	If it occurs – who is responsible for what?	this contact?	harm that can	risk that still
cause harm?	to protect?	the receptor?			be caused?	remains?
Site Wide - genera	I					
Flooding leading	Ground /	Floodwaters /	Preventative controls	Likely	Medium	Moderate
to damage to site processes and/or mobilisation of polluting materials	groundwater / surface waters	Infiltration	 Flood risk review undertaken. Parts of the STF installation lie within Flood Zone 2 (land having between a 1 in 100 and 1 in 1,000 annual probability of river flooding), and parts lie within Flood Zone 1 (Land having a 1 in 100 or greater annual probability of river flooding). The site is built on a gradient. Major process tanks are constructed significantly above river level. Materials are stored in appropriately sealed containers (preferably bulk or semi-bulk), or proprietary secondary containment cabinets, such that the risk of contents being mobilised, or containers being washed away in a flood event is low. Vulnerable Asset Protection Plan specifically details flooding actions including how river 			risk

Table 5: Potential accidental releases and associated risk

What harm can be caused and who can be harmed		an be harmed	Managing the risk	Assessing the risk (after preventative controls)		
Hazard	Receptor	Pathway	Risk management	Probability of	Environmental	What is the
				exposure	Consequence	overall risk?
What has the	What is at risk?	How can the	What measures will you take to reduce the risk?	How likely is	What is the	What is the
potential to	What do I wish	hazard get to	If it occurs – who is responsible for what?	this contact?	harm that can	risk that still
cause harm?	to protect?	the receptor?			be caused?	remains?
			levels should be monitored and what actions			
			are required.			
			In the event of an incident/accident			
			Initiate site emergency plan.			
			Remove mobile fuel/ chemical sources away			
			from flood risk, if appropriate and safe to do			
			SO.			
Flooding due to	Ground /	Floodwaters /	Preventative controls	Unlikely	Mild	Low risk
drain blockages	groundwater /	Infiltration	Drains are monitored for blockages and	,		
and/or excessive	surface waters		cleaned as required.			
rainfall causing			Materials are stored in appropriately sealed			
localised on-site			containers (preferably bulk or semi-bulk), or			
surface water			proprietary secondary containment cabinets,			
flooding leading			such that the risk of contents being			
to damage to site			mobilised, or containers being washed away			
processes and/or			in a flood event is low.			
mobilisation of			Vulnerable Asset Protection Plan specifically			
polluting			details flooding actions.			
materials			Planned maintenance / inspection of site			
			drainage systems.			
			In the event of an incident/accident			
			Initiate site emergency plan.			
			Remove mobile fuel/ chemical sources away			
			from flood risk, if appropriate and safe to do			
			so.			
Fire	Nearby human	Air	Preventative controls	Highly unlikely	Severe	Low risk
	receptors					

What harm can be caused and who can be harmed		an be harmed	Managing the risk	Assessing the risk (after preventative controls)		
Hazard	Receptor	Pathway	Risk management	Probability of	Environmental	What is the
				exposure	Consequence	overall risk?
What has the	What is at risk?	How can the	What measures will you take to reduce the risk?	How likely is	What is the	What is the
potential to	What do I wish	hazard get to	If it occurs – who is responsible for what?	this contact?	harm that can	risk that still
cause harm?	to protect?	the receptor?			be caused?	remains?
		Overland	Regular maintenance of equipment; LDAR			
	Local air quality	runoff /	programme in place.			
	and global	infiltration /	• Fire alarms are fitted in CHP/boiler rooms.			
	climate impacts	drainage	DSEAR assessment has been completed for			
		systems	site and only appropriate ATEX rated			
	Ground /		equipment may be used in high-risk areas.			
	groundwater /		Access controls in place for digester			
	surface waters		compound and portable gas monitor use			
			required when inside compound.			
			• Site does not treat combustible wastes.			
			Sludge is wet.			
			• Gas slam shut valves on biogas feeds to the			
			CHP / boiler.			
			Gas and fire detection in the boiler/CHP			
			rooms, and other key AD plant areas.			
			Lightning protection provided for biogas			
			storage.			
			In the event of an incident/accident			
			Follow site emergency procedure.			
			Hydrants connected to a final effluent supply			
			can be used by the fire service.			
			• Excess biogas created by the site will be			
			burnt through the flare.			
Failure to contain	Ground /	Floodwaters /	Preventative controls	Highly unlikely	Medium	Low risk
firewater	groundwater /	Infiltration	Site drainage collects and returns			
following fire /	surface waters		surface/yard water to WwTW for treatment.			
explosion event						

What harm can be caused and who can be harmed		an be harmed	Managing the risk	Assessing the risk (after preventative controls)			
Hazard	Receptor	Pathway	Risk management	Probability of	Environmental	What is the	
				exposure	Consequence	overall risk?	
What has the	What is at risk?	How can the	What measures will you take to reduce the risk?	How likely is	What is the	What is the	
potential to	What do I wish	hazard get to	If it occurs – who is responsible for what?	this contact?	harm that can	risk that still	
cause harm?	to protect?	the receptor?			be caused?	remains?	
leading to			(with the exception of roof water from two				
localised on site			buildings).				
surface water			• Site drainage systems, hardstanding, sumps,				
flooding leading			storm tanks etc will minimise flow of firewater				
to damage to site			to receptors.				
processes and/or			In the event of an incident/accident				
mobilisation of			Initiate site emergency procedure.				
polluting							
materials							
Excessively low	Nearby human	Air	Preventative controls	Unlikely	Mild	Low risk	
temperatures	receptors		'Winterisation' procedures.				
leading to		Overland	Bunding provided to environmentally critical				
blockages or	Local air quality	runoff /	plant and equipment.				
damage to	and global	infiltration /	Current YW technical standards include trace				
pipework, valves	climate impacts	drainage	heating for vulnerable pipework.				
or equipment		systems	In the event of an incident/accident				
and unplanned	Ground /		Isolate systems as appropriate and initiate				
release of gas	groundwater /		fire, spill and emergency response				
with fire /	surface waters		procedures, cleaning up spill and disposal of				
explosions risks			wastes appropriately.				
and/or release of			Carry out repairs (as required).				
potentially							
polluting liquids							
Generalised or	Nearby human	Air	Preventative controls	Unlikely	Mild	Low risk	
localised power	receptors		• Site has a dual power supply to minimise risk				
failure leading to		Overland	of power failure.				
failure of pumps /		runoff /					

What harm can be	caused and who can be harmed		Managing the risk	Assessing the risk (after preventative controls)		
Hazard	Receptor	Pathway	Risk management	Probability of	Environmental	What is the
				exposure	Consequence	overall risk?
What has the	What is at risk?	How can the	What measures will you take to reduce the risk?	How likely is	What is the	What is the
potential to	What do I wish	hazard get to	If it occurs – who is responsible for what?	this contact?	harm that can	risk that stil
cause harm?	to protect?	the receptor?			be caused?	remains?
control systems	Local air quality	infiltration /	Process for recovering from power failure has			
and escape of	and global	drainage	been planned and recorded.			
sludge and/or	climate impacts	systems	• In the event of power failure, sludge transfers			
biogas			will stop but this will not affect security of			
	Ground /		containment e.g., tanks will not overflow.			
	groundwater /		In the event of an incident/accident			
	surface waters		Halt sludge imports to site.			
			Confirm backup power supply is online.			
			Confirm that all systems are operating			
			normally.			
Vandalism / site	Nearby human	Air	Preventative controls	Highly unlikely	Mild	Negligible
security failure	receptors		High level of security on site with 24 hr			risk
leading to		Overland	security monitoring, secure entry gate			
unplanned	Local air quality	runoff /	systems and locked cabs and control units.			
release of gas	and global	infiltration /	• In addition to perimeter fencing around site,			
with fire /	climate impacts	drainage	key digestion equipment sits within a			
explosions risks		systems	separate fenced area.			
and/or release of	Ground /		Storage containers bunded.			
potentially	groundwater /		In the event of an incident/accident			
polluting liquids	surface waters		Isolate systems as appropriate and initiate			
(chemicals, oils,			fire, spill, and emergency response			
sludges)			procedures, cleaning up spill and disposal of			
-			wastes appropriately.			
			Carry out repairs (as required).			
			Review security measures on site.			
Cyber security	Nearby human	Air	Preventative controls	Highly unlikely	Mild	Negligible
incident which	receptors					risk

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What harm can be caused and who can be harmed		an be harmed	Managing the risk	Assessing the risk (after preventative controls)		
Hazard	Receptor	Pathway	Risk management	Probability of exposure	Environmental Consequence	What is the overall risk?
What has the	What is at risk?	How can the	What measures will you take to reduce the risk?	How likely is	What is the	What is the
potential to	What do I wish	hazard get to	If it occurs – who is responsible for what?	this contact?	harm that can	risk that stil
cause harm?	to protect?	the receptor?			be caused?	remains?
leads to	Local air quality	Overland	YW operates an information security			
unauthorised site	and global	runoff /	management system to provide cyber			
access and	climate impacts	infiltration /	security protection and response.			
unplanned	Ground /	drainage	High level of security on site with 24 hr			
release of gas	groundwater /	systems	security monitoring, secure entry gate			
with fire /	surface waters		systems and locked cabs and control units.			
explosions risks			Storage containers bunded.			
and/or release of			In the event of an incident/accident			
potentially			Isolate systems as appropriate and initiate			
polluting liquids			fire, spill, and emergency response			
(chemicals, oils,			procedures, cleaning up spill and disposal of			
sludges)			wastes appropriately.			
			Carry out repairs (as required).			
			Review cyber security measures.			
Failure of	Ground /	Overland	Preventative controls	Unlikely	Mild	Low risk
chemical or oil	groundwater /	runoff /	• All oil storage and waste oil storage tanks are			
containment due	surface waters	infiltration /	fully bunded (using either fixed or mobile			
to deterioration of		drainage	bunds).			
storage		systems	Joints external to containment minimised			
containers,			and fully welded.			
pipework or			Tank and pipework inspections undertaken			
valves leading to			as part of routine maintenance.			
spillage			Operational procedures for refilling oil and			
			chemical storage tanks. Spill kit to be			
			available at tanks.			

What harm can be caused and who can be harmed		an be harmed	Managing the risk	Assessing the risk (after preventative controls)		
Hazard	Receptor	Pathway	Risk management	Probability of	Environmental	What is the
				exposure	Consequence	overall risk?
What has the	What is at risk?	How can the	What measures will you take to reduce the risk?	How likely is	What is the	What is the
potential to	What do I wish	hazard get to	If it occurs – who is responsible for what?	this contact?	harm that can	risk that stil
cause harm?	to protect?	the receptor?			be caused?	remains?
			Any oil spill around engines during			
			maintenance will be cleaned up and			
			disposed of appropriately.			
			In the event of an incident/accident			
			Isolate systems as appropriate and initiate			
			spill response procedure, cleaning up spill			
			and disposal of wastes appropriately.			
			Carry out repairs (as required).			
			Review systems to prevent recurrence.			
Failure of	Ground /	Overland	Preventative controls	Unlikely	Mild	Low risk
chemical or oil	groundwater /	runoff /	Delivery procedures inc. supervision by site			
containment	surface waters	infiltration /	staff, check on space available in receiving			
during delivery		drainage	tank.			
		systems	Storage containers bunded.			
			Chemical/oil storage only in area surrounded			
			by hardstanding with all drainage directed to			
			WwTW.			
			In the event of an incident/accident			
			Follow incident plan.			
Vehicle impact	Nearby human	Air	Preventative controls	Unlikely	Medium	Low risk
leading to loss of	receptors		Site speed limits in place to reduce chance			
pressurised gas			and consequence of collision.			
and explosion /	Contribution to		Tanker discharge point and access to this			
fire risk or loss of	local air		area are controlled by manned security point			
liquid	pollution and		at main site entrance.			
containment	global warming		Key areas including barriers to prevent			
			collision with equipment.			

What harm can be caused and who can be harmed		can be harmed	Managing the risk	Assessing the risk (after preventative controls)		
Hazard	Receptor	Pathway	Risk management	Probability of	Environmental	What is the
				exposure	Consequence	overall risk?
What has the	What is at risk?	How can the	What measures will you take to reduce the risk?	How likely is	What is the	What is the
potential to	What do I wish	hazard get to	If it occurs – who is responsible for what?	this contact?	harm that can	risk that stil
cause harm?	to protect?	the receptor?			be caused?	remains?
(chemicals, oils,	Ground /	-	Key digestion assets including digestion			
sludges)	groundwater /		tanks are set back from road and surrounded			
	surface waters		by a fence.			
			Site drainage will capture spills related to			
			pipe failure.			
			In the event of an incident/accident			
			Isolate systems as appropriate and initiate			
			fire, spill and emergency response			
			procedures, cleaning up spill and disposal of			
			wastes appropriately.			
			Carry out repairs (as required)			
Excessive noise	Nearby human	Air	Preventative controls	Unlikely	Mild	Low risk
from plant or	receptors		Procurement controls mean plant are			
equipment e.g.,			selected to comply with relevant noise limits.			
due to equipment			Regular maintenance completed to ensure			
deterioration or			equipment operates within normal noise			
failure			parameters.			
			Acoustic enclosures / controls on some noise			
			generating plan (e.g. compressors).			
			Sensitive receptors not located within close			
			proximity to the site.			
			In the event of an incident/accident			
			Investigate cause and implement preventive			
			measures, which may include system			
			maintenance interventions.			

What harm can be caused and who can be harmed		can be harmed	Managing the risk	Assessing the risk (after preventative controls)		
Hazard	Receptor	Pathway	Risk management	Probability of	Environmental	What is the
				exposure	Consequence	overall risk?
What has the	What is at risk?	How can the	What measures will you take to reduce the risk?	How likely is	What is the	What is the
potential to	What do I wish	hazard get to	If it occurs – who is responsible for what?	this contact?	harm that can	risk that still
cause harm?	to protect?	the receptor?			be caused?	remains?
Excessive has	Nearby human	Air	Preventative controls	Unlikely	Medium	Moderate/Lc
pressure in	receptors		Operators are trained to operate site within			w risk
vessels causing		Overland	design parameters.			
pipework/tank	Ground /	runoff /	Process has automated process in place to			
rupture	groundwater /	infiltration /	prevent dangerous occurrences.			
	surface waters	drainage	Alarms alert operators if a hazardous			
		systems	situation is developing.			
			In the event of an incident/accident			
			Pressure relief valves are fitted to tanks to			
			protect against damage from excess			
			pressure.			
Site wide - sludge	pipework, tanks, v	alves				
Spillage of sludge	Ground /	Overland	Preventative controls	Likely	Minor /	Low risk
during transfer /	groundwater /	runoff /	Staff training on system operation.		negligible	
handling	surface waters	infiltration /	Hardstanding in key/high risk areas.			
activities		drainage	• Site drainage returns surface runoff to WwTW			
		systems	In the event of an incident/accident			
			Isolate systems as appropriate and initiate			
			spill response procedure, cleaning up spill			
			and disposal of wastes appropriately.			
Failure (cracks,	Ground /	Infiltration	Preventative controls	Unlikely	Medium	Moderate /
splitting) of	groundwater /		Existing underground pipework will be			Low risk
underground	surface waters		periodically surveyed using in-pipe crack			
pipework (e.g.			detection technology.			
fuel, chemicals,			• Where new pipework at the site has to be			
			underground, the containment provision will			

What harm can be caused and who can be harmed		can be harmed	Managing the risk	Assessing the risk (after preventative controls)			
Hazard	Receptor	Pathway	Risk management	Probability of	Environmental	What is the	
				exposure	Consequence	overall risk?	
What has the	What is at risk?	How can the	What measures will you take to reduce the risk?	How likely is	What is the	What is the	
potential to	What do I wish	hazard get to	If it occurs – who is responsible for what?	this contact?	harm that can	risk that still	
cause harm?	to protect?	the receptor?			be caused?	remains?	
sludge, site			be risk assessed and appropriate design				
drains)			specification implemented, which may				
			include secondary containment and leak				
			detection.				
			In the event of an incident/accident				
			Damaged pipe will be isolated.				
			Spill management procedure will be				
			followed.				
			Repairs to damaged pipework will be				
			arranged.				
Minor failure of	Ground /	Overland	Preventative controls	Likely	Minor /	Minor risk	
sludge storage	groundwater /	runoff /	• High level probes to prevent overfilling of		negligible		
tanks / digester	surface waters	infiltration /	tanks, overflow pipework is in place as a				
tanks e.g., tank		drainage	failsafe.				
overtopping,		systems	• Trace heating is provided to tank level gauges				
pipework leaks			to prevent freezing and reduce the risk of false				
			readings.				
			• Site is monitored on a daily basis.				
			Infrastructure maintenance and inspections.				
			• Protective measures as for sludge spillage.				
			Refer to Secondary Containment Report for				
			details of risk assessment				
			In the event of an incident/accident				
			Isolate systems as appropriate and initiate				
			spill response procedure, cleaning up spill and				
			disposal of wastes appropriately.				
			Arrange repairs.				

What harm can be caused and who can be harmed		an be harmed	Managing the risk	Assessing the risk (after preventative controls)		
Hazard	Receptor	Pathway	Risk management	Probability of exposure	Environmental Consequence	What is the overall risk
What has the	What is at risk?	How can the	What measures will you take to reduce the risk?	How likely is	What is the	What is the
potential to	What do I wish	hazard get to	If it occurs – who is responsible for what?	this contact?	harm that can	risk that stil
cause harm?	to protect?	the receptor?			be caused?	remains?
Major failure of	Ground /	Overland	Preventative controls	Highly unlikely	Severe	Moderate /
digester or other	groundwater /	runoff /	Design and construction of assets is			Low risk
sludge storage	surface waters	infiltration /	governed by relevant YW technical			
tank or		drainage	standards to ensure it is fit for purpose.			
associated		systems	Infrastructure maintenance and inspections.			
pipework leading			• Existing and planned bunding / secondary			
to large scale			containment (Refer to Secondary			
sludge			Containment Report).			
loss/spillage			Site drainage returns to WwTW for safe			
			processing.			
			In the event of an incident/accident			
			Cancel all sludge deliveries to site.			
			Isolate systems as appropriate and initiate			
			spill response procedure, cleaning up spill			
			and disposal of wastes appropriately.			
Biogas pipework, v	alves vents	1		1		
• • • •	1	A :	Process testing a central la	Linkingha	h tim on /	Negligible
Failure of biogas	Nearby human	Air	Preventative controls	Unlikely	Minor /	Negligible
pipework, valves,	receptors		Design and construction of pipework is		negligible	risk
and biogas			governed by relevant YW technical			
holder (corrosion,	Local air quality		standards to ensure it is fit for purpose.			
cracks, material	and global		Most biogas pipework operates at low			
defects etc)	climate impacts		pressures.			
leading to minor			Pipework/gas holders protected from			
release of biogas			excessive pressure by pressure relief valves.			
and slight fire /			Pipework is above ground where possible to			

facilitate inspection and maintenance.

explosion risk

What harm can be caused and who can be harmed		an be harmed	Managing the risk	Assessing the risk (after preventative controls)			
Hazard	Receptor	Pathway	Risk management	Probability of	Environmental	What is the	
				exposure	Consequence	overall risk?	
What has the	What is at risk?	How can the	What measures will you take to reduce the risk?	How likely is	What is the	What is the	
potential to	What do I wish	hazard get to	If it occurs – who is responsible for what?	this contact?	harm that can	risk that stil	
cause harm?	to protect?	the receptor?			be caused?	remains?	
			 Maintenance schedule defined as part of LDAR strategy at site. Requirements around use of ATEX rated equipment control risk of leak leading to fire/explosion. In the event of an incident/accident Consider need to isolate pipework. Consider need to initiate emergency response procedures. 				
Failure of biogas	Nearby human	Air	Arrange repair to affected asset. Preventative controls	Highly Unlikely	Medium	Low risk	
pipework, valves, and biogas holder (corrosion, cracks, material defects etc) leading to major release of biogas and fire/ explosion risk	receptors Local air quality and global climate impacts		 Design and construction of pipework is governed by relevant YW technical standards to ensure it is fit for purpose. Most biogas pipework operates at low pressures. Pipework/gas holders protected from excessive pressure by pressure relief valves. Pipework is above ground where possible to facilitate inspection and maintenance. Maintenance schedule defined as part of LDAR strategy at site. Standard operational H&S requires staff to wear personal gas monitors at all times, these will detect large scale leakage from pipes. 				

What harm can be caused and who can be harmed		an be harmed	Managing the risk	Assessing the risk (after preventative controls)		
Hazard	Receptor	Pathway	Risk management	Probability of exposure	Environmental Consequence	What is the overall risk?
What has the	What is at risk?	How can the	What measures will you take to reduce the risk?	How likely is	What is the	What is the
potential to	What do I wish	hazard get to	If it occurs – who is responsible for what?	this contact?	harm that can	risk that still
cause harm?	to protect?	the receptor?			be caused?	remains?
			 Requirements around use of ATEX rated equipment control risk of leak leading to fire/explosion. In the event of an incident/accident Immediately follow safety control mechanisms in place to isolate pipework / equipment. Consider need to initiate emergency 			
Breakdown or	Nearby human	Air	response procedures. Preventative controls	Unlikely	Mild	Low risk
other damage to on-site gas consumers e.g. CHP/boiler leading to disposal of biogas without energy recovery	receptors Local air quality and global climate impacts		 Site is designed to minimise risk of uncontrolled release to air. Operational and maintenance controls in place to ensure reliability of equipment and minimise requirement to send biogas to flare. There are four CHP engines and two steam boilers with biogas firing capability, therefore flaring rarely occurs. In the event of an incident/accident Any remaining capacity on on-site gas storage will fill. Once gas storage is full flare will operate, ensuring proper combustion of biogas. If flare fails, gas will vent through PRVs to prevent damage to site gas system. 			

What harm can be caused and who can be harmed		an be harmed	Managing the risk	Assessing the risk (after preventative controls)		
Hazard	Receptor	Pathway	Risk management	Probability of exposure	Environmental Consequence	What is the overall risk?
What has the	What is at risk?	How can the	What measures will you take to reduce the risk?	How likely is	What is the	What is the
potential to	What do I wish	hazard get to	If it occurs – who is responsible for what?	this contact?	harm that can	risk that still
cause harm?	to protect?	the receptor?			be caused?	remains?
Failure of flare	Local air quality	Air	Preventative controls	Unlikely	Mild	Low risk
leading to release	and global		• Flare burns biogas in a controlled way to			
of unburnt biogas	climate impacts		reduce environmental harm.			
to atmosphere			Operational and maintenance controls in			
			place to minimise requirement to send			
			biogas to flare.			
			• Flare has control system that ensures ignition			
			e.g., flame detection.			
			Maintenance programme in place to ensure			
			that flare is always in good operational			
			condition.			
			In the event of an incident/accident			
			Raise urgent maintenance request for repairs			
			to flare.			
			If flare fails, valve will automatically shut			
			down flow of gas to flare.			
			Once all site gas containment is full, pressure			
			will release through PRVs to prevent damage			
			to equipment and uncontrolled release of			
			biogas.			
Incorrect setting	Local air quality	Air	Preventative controls	Unlikely	Minor /	Negligible
or damage to	and global		Inspection and maintenance of PRVs carried		negligible	risk
emergency	climate impacts		out on a routine basis to ensure they are set			
pressure relief			and operate correctly.			
valves leads to			Checks on PRVs part of normal operational			
premature			routine.			
release of gas or						

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What harm can be	an be caused and who can be harmed Managing the risk	Assessing the risk (after preventative controls)				
Hazard	Receptor	Pathway	Risk management	Probability of	Environmental	What is the
				exposure	Consequence	overall risk?
What has the	What is at risk?	How can the	What measures will you take to reduce the risk?	How likely is	What is the	What is the
potential to	What do I wish	hazard get to	If it occurs – who is responsible for what?	this contact?	harm that can	risk that still
cause harm?	to protect?	the receptor?			be caused?	remains?
valve fails to			Over-pressure alarms in control system will			
reseat after			alert site staff to incidents that could trigger			
release leading to			PRV release.			
uncontrolled			In the event of an incident/accident			
release of biogas			Follow management procedures to ensure			
to atmosphere			that the valves are re-seated/pressure			
			setting adjusted rapidly and without putting			
			staff at risk.			
Digester foaming	Local air quality	Air	Preventative controls	Unlikely	Mild	Low risk
blocks gas lines,	and global		• Feed rate to digesters is controlled to prevent			
leading to release	climate impacts		organic overloading.			
of biogas and/or			Digester mixing is regularly assessed as part			
foam through			of operational checks to ensure that it is			
PRVs			functioning effectively.			
			Feedstock assessment ensures that nature			
			and quality of feedstock is understood.			
			Anti-foam system is fitted to digesters to			
			control foaming.			
			In the event of an incident/accident			
			Follow site procedures for dealing with			
			foaming.			
			Investigate cause and implement preventive			
			measures.			
			• Ensure that PRVs are not blocked with foam			
			and operating correctly to protect tanks.			
			Ensure PRVs reseat once pressure in			
			headspace returns to normal levels.			

What harm can be	caused and who a	can be harmed	Managing the risk	Assessing the r	isk (after preventa	itive controls)
Hazard	Receptor	Pathway	Risk management	Probability of	Environmental	What is the
				exposure	Consequence	overall risk?
What has the	What is at risk?	How can the	What measures will you take to reduce the risk?	How likely is	What is the	What is the
potential to	What do I wish	hazard get to	If it occurs – who is responsible for what?	this contact?	harm that can	risk that still
cause harm?	to protect?	the receptor?			be caused?	remains?
Spillage / loss of	Ground /	Overland	Preventative controls	Unlikely	Minor /	Negligible
containment of	groundwater /	runoff /	• Checks on condensate traps and valves are		negligible	risk
liquids	surface waters	infiltration /	part of regular operational routine.			
		drainage	• Condensate runs to site drainage for			
		systems	treatment.			
			• Digester operation is controlled to minimise			
			risk of foaming, which could lead to			
			blockages on condensate system.			
			In the event of an incident/accident			
			Clear up any spills.			
			• Ensure all valves are operating correctly.			
Sludge treatment	processes			•		
Import of sludge	Ground	Spread to land	Preventative controls	Unlikely	Minor /	Negligible
which does not		as part of	• YW control all sites supplying sludge to the		negligible	risk
meet waste		disposal	STF. Only YW sewage waste is imported to			
acceptance			Esholt STF, this has a consistent composition			
criteria leading to			and comes from carefully controlled			
disruption to			treatment processes.			
sludge treatment			• Prior to initial acceptance of sludge from a			
processes			new YW site, a screening assessment will be			
			completed to confirm it is safe and stable.			
			• JRP – WaSP system records the dry solids,			
			volume and origin of every import brought to			
			site.			
			• Site operators and tanker drivers are trained			
			to identify problem sludges and divert them			
			to alternative sites for treatment.			

What harm can be	e caused and who a	can be harmed	Managing the risk	Assessing the r	risk (after prevento	itive controls)
Hazard	Receptor	Pathway	Risk management	Probability of	Environmental	What is the
				exposure	Consequence	overall risk?
What has the	What is at risk?	How can the	What measures will you take to reduce the risk?	How likely is	What is the	What is the
potential to	What do I wish	hazard get to	If it occurs – who is responsible for what?	this contact?	harm that can	risk that stil
cause harm?	to protect?	the receptor?			be caused?	remains?
			In the event of an incident/accident			
			Digester health will be investigated to			
			understand cause of problem and best route			
			to resolution.			
			Digestate being removed from digesters will			
			be subject to enhanced monitoring to ensure			
			that there is no environmental risk. Note this			
			is also a HACCP requirement.			
			• Where relevant the Environment Agency will			
			be alerted that a problem has occurred.			
			• The root cause of the problem will be			
			investigated, and procedures updated so the			
			incident cannot recur.			
Failure/blockage	Ground	Overland	Preventative controls	Likely	Minor /	Low risk
of sludge		runoff /	Design and construction controls ensure		negligible	
screening facility	Air	infiltration /	equipment is correctly specified for task.			
leading to		drainage	Maintenance to ensure reliable operation of			
spillage and		systems	equipment.			
excess odour			• Imports are from YW sites which gives control			
emissions		Odour to air	over content.			
			Hardstanding around import facility prevents			
			spills travelling to land.			
			Site drainage will collect spills and return to			
			WwTW for treatment.			
			In the event of an incident/accident			
			Stop imports.			
			Clean up spill.			

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What harm can be	caused and who a	an be harmed	Managing the risk	Assessing the r	isk (after preventa	itive controls)
Hazard	Receptor	Pathway	Risk management	Probability of exposure	Environmental Consequence	What is the overall risk?
What has the	What is at risk?	How can the	What measures will you take to reduce the risk?	How likely is	What is the	What is the
potential to	What do I wish	hazard get to	If it occurs – who is responsible for what?	this contact?	harm that can	risk that still
cause harm?	to protect?	the receptor?			be caused?	remains?
			Unblock screens.			
Sludge	Ground	Spread to land	Preventative controls	Highly Unlikely	Medium	Low risk
contamination		as part of	Management controls to identify potentially			
leading to		disposal	problematic sludges at source.			
inhibition of			All sludge imports are from YW sites where			
microbial activity			sludge characteristics are considered stable.			
/ process			Contamination levels would need to be very			
disruption and			severe to significantly impact digestion			
insufficient			processes due to the very large digester			
digestion			volume.			
			In the event of an incident/accident			
			Assess digester content to decide best route			
			to normal digester health.			
			Sample cake prior to export from site to			
			confirm it is safe to spread to land.			
			Review acceptance procedures.			

What harm can be	caused and who c	an be harmed	Managing the risk	Assessing the r	isk (after preventa	tive controls)
Hazard	Receptor	Pathway	Risk management	Probability of	Environmental	What is the
				exposure	Consequence	overall risk?
What has the	What is at risk?	How can the	What measures will you take to reduce the risk?	How likely is	What is the	What is the
potential to	What do I wish	hazard get to	If it occurs – who is responsible for what?	this contact?	harm that can	risk that still
cause harm?	to protect?	the receptor?			be caused?	remains?
Excessive feeding	Ground /	Spread to land	Preventative controls	Highly Unlikely	Medium	Low risk
of digester leads	groundwater /	as part of	THP prior to digestion achieves high			
to reduced	surface waters	disposal	pathogen kill and improves sludge			
retention time			digestibility.			
and failure to			Staff training			
meet pathogen			Digesters have a maximum feed interlock			
kill requirements			ensuring that a set daily feed volume cannot			
			be exceeded. This limit has been calculated			
			to ensure digester stability and			
			environmental safety.			
			HACCP monitoring.			
			In the event of an incident/accident			
			Turn off digester feed.			
			Stop additional sludge imports until normal			
			operational situation returns.			
Failure of	Ground /	Overland	Preventative controls	Unlikely	Minor/negligible	Negligible
dewatering	groundwater /	runoff /	• Liquid runoff from sludge cake pad collected			risk
process leading	surface waters	infiltration /	and directed to WwTW for treatment. System			
to discharge to		drainage	has large storage and handling capacity.			
cake pad of cake		systems	In the event of an incident/accident			
with high water			• Switch off centrifuge and identify cause of			
content			problem.			
Temporary	Local air quality	Air	Preventative controls	Likely	Minor/negligible	Low risk
cessation of land	and global		• Esholt cake storage is normally within a			
spreading e.g.	climate impacts		covered barn, which under normal			
due to extreme			circumstances, has spare capacity. If this			
weather						

Hazard	Receptor	Pathway	Risk management	Probability of exposure	Environmental Consequence	What is the overall risk?
What has the	What is at risk?	How can the	What measures will you take to reduce the risk?	How likely is	What is the	What is the
potential to	What do I wish	hazard get to	If it occurs – who is responsible for what?	this contact?	harm that can	risk that still
cause harm?	to protect?	the receptor?			be caused?	remains?
conditions,			becomes full, a cake storage pad is available			
leading to build			to hold excess production.			
up of digested sludge cake			Additional storage is available at nearby YW sites.			
			In the event of an incident/accident			
			Monitor available storage on cake barn and			
			reduce/stop sludge imports as required.			
			• Divert sludge imports to alternative YW sites			
			for storage.			
Very warm	Local air quality	Air	Preventative controls	Likely	Minor/negligible	Low risk
weather leading			• Only likely to happen during a prolonged of			
to increase in			extreme weather event.			
odour generation			Sludge cake secondary maturation or lime			
from sludge cake			addition not required at this site due to THP.			
			Cake is normally removed from site promptly.			
			In the event of an incident/accident			
			Initial response would be to review operating			
			times and avoid cake generation during			
			problematic weather events, considering			
			both temperature and wind.			
			• If this was not sufficient, YW would look to			
			remove cake from site and store elsewhere.			
Odour extraction a	Ind dispersal				<u> </u>	
Failure of	Nearby human	Air	Preventative controls	Unlikely	Mild	Low risk
components	receptors					

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What harm can be	1		Managing the risk		isk (after prevento	1
Hazard	Receptor	Pathway	Risk management	Probability of	Environmental	What is the
				exposure	Consequence	overall risk?
What has the	What is at risk?	How can the	What measures will you take to reduce the risk?	How likely is	What is the	What is the
potential to	What do I wish	hazard get to	If it occurs – who is responsible for what?	this contact?	harm that can	risk that stil
cause harm?	to protect?	the receptor?			be caused?	remains?
within odour			• Regular operational checks on systems (e.g.			
extraction and	Local air quality		fan operation).			
dispersal systems	and global		Inspection and maintenance schedule to			
leading to	climate impacts		ensure reliability of extraction and treatment			
reduced			system.			
dispersion of			In the event of an incident/accident			
odorous			Follow operational procedures to minimise			
emissions to air			generation of emissions until system is			
			repaired.			
CHPs, Boiler, and o	ther gas consume	ſS		1	1	-
Excessive	Nearby human	Air	Preventative controls	Unlikely	Mild	Low risk
emissions to air	receptors		Planned preventative maintenance in place	,		
from boilers and			for equipment to ensure assets continue to			
CHP e.g., due to	Local air quality		meet original specification on emissions.			
equipment	and global		Site operational knowledge supported			
failure, poor	climate impacts		through contracts with specialist providers.			
performance or			Regular emissions monitoring timetable in			
malfunction			operation to confirm required performance			
leading to			level is maintained.			
incomplete or			In the event of an incident/accident			
inefficient			Investigate cause and implement preventive			
combustion			measures, which may include system			
			maintenance interventions.			
Pipe Bridge						
Rupture due to	Surface waters	Air	Preventative controls	Highly unlikely	Medium	Low risk
impact						

What harm can k	be caused and who o	can be harmed	Managing the risk	Assessing the r	isk (after prevento	itive controls)
Hazard	Receptor	Pathway	Risk management	Probability of	Environmental	What is the
				exposure	Consequence	overall risk?
What has the	What is at risk?	How can the	What measures will you take to reduce the risk?	How likely is	What is the	What is the
potential to	What do I wish	hazard get to	If it occurs – who is responsible for what?	this contact?	harm that can	risk that still
cause harm?	to protect?	the receptor?			be caused?	remains?
			 Pipes are attached to the downstream side of road bridge. This is of a substantial concrete construction. The river is not navigable by boats, no risk of impact from river traffic. Site flood protection plan dictates that process is stopped once river level reaches pre-determined level. Pumps will not be actively moving sludge across bridge in high water situations. In the event of an incident/accident Pressure sensors will automatically stop pumps moving flow over pipe bridge. 			
Rupture due to freezing	Surface waters	Air	 Preventative controls Insulation fitted to pipes. Trace heating fitted to all pipes at risk of freezing including sludge, wash water, and potable water. In the event of an incident/accident Pressure sensors will automatically stop pumps moving flow over pipe bridge. 	Unlikely	Mild	Low risk
Rupture due to pressure	Surface waters	Air	 Preventative controls Air release valves fitted to pipework. Pumps that have potential to generate high pressures e.g. progressive cavity pumps will be fitted with high pressure cut out sensors. 	Highly Unlikely	Medium	Low risk

What harm can b	pe caused and who a	an be harmed	Managing the risk Assessing th		e risk (after preventative controls)	
Hazard	Receptor	Pathway	Risk management	Probability of	Environmental	What is the
				exposure	Consequence	overall risk?
What has the	What is at risk?	How can the	What measures will you take to reduce the risk?	How likely is What is the What is		What is the
potential to	What do I wish	hazard get to	If it occurs – who is responsible for what?	this contact? harm that can risk that		risk that still
cause harm?	to protect?	the receptor?			be caused?	remains?
			Maintenance and inspection regime to			
			confirm integrity of pipes.			
			In the event of an incident/accident			
			Pressure sensors will automatically stop			
			pumps moving flow over pipe bridge.			

Risk Assessment Methodology

The risk assessment methodology employed for the accident management plan is summarised in Tables A to D below.

The overall risk rating for each of the identified risk scenarios is determined on the basis of the probability of the scenario occurring (the probability/likelihood score) and the environmental consequence(s) if the scenario were to occur (the consequence score). The probability and consequence categories used in this methodology are provided in Tables A and B below.

Classification	Definition
Severe	 Acute risks to human health Short-term risk of pollution of sensitive water resource (e.g. major spillage into controlled waters) Impact on controlled waters e.g. large-scale pollution or very high levels of contamination Catastrophic damage to buildings or property (e.g. explosion causing building collapse) Ecological system effects – irreversible adverse changes to a protected location. Immediate risks
Medium	 Chronic risks to human health Pollution of sensitive water resources (e.g. leaching of contaminants into controlled waters) Ecological system effects - substantial adverse changes to a protected location Significant damage to buildings, structures and services (e.g. damage rendering a building unsafe to occupy, such as foundation damage)
Mild	 Non-permanent health effects to human health Pollution of non-sensitive water resources (e.g. pollution of non-classified groundwater) Damage to buildings, structures and services (e.g. damage rendering a building unsafe to occupy, such as foundation damage) Substantial damage to non-sensitive environments (unprotected ecosystems e.g. crops)
Minor/Negligible	 Non-permanent health effects to human health (easily prevented by appropriate use of PPE) Minor pollution to non-sensitive water resources Minor damage to non-sensitive environments (unprotected ecosystems e.g. crops) Easily repairable effects of damage to buildings, structures, services or the environment (e.g. discoloration of concrete, loss of plants in a landscaping scene)

Table A: Classification of Consequences

Table B: Classification of probability / Likelihood

Classification	Definition
High Likelihood	An event is very likely to occur in the short term, and is almost inevitable over the long term OR there is evidence at the receptor of harm or pollution
Likely	It is probable that an event will occur. It is not inevitable, but possible in the short term and likely over the long term
Unlikely	Circumstances are possible under which an event could occur. It is by no means certain that even over a longer period such an event would take place, and less likely in the short term
Highly Unlikely	Probability is so low that it is close to zero; It is improbable that an event would occur even in the very long term

Table C below provides the matrix used to identify the overall risk category using these consequence and probability categories.

Table C: Risk Matrix and Terminology Used for Risk Assessments
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		Consequence			
		Severe	Medium	Mild	Minor/Negligi ble
Probability (Likelihood)	High Likelihood	Very high risk	High risk	Moderate risk	Moderate/Lo w risk
	Likely	High risk	Moderate risk	Moderate/Low risk	Low risk
	Unlikely	Moderate risk	Moderate/Low risk	Low risk	Negligible risk
	Highly Unlikely	Moderate/Low risk	Low risk	Negligible risk	Negligible risk

The overall risk categories are described in Table D below.

Table D: Description of Risk Categories

Term	Description
Very high risk	Severe harm to a receptor may already be occurring OR a high likelihood that severe harm will arise to a receptor, unless immediate remedial action works / mitigation measures are undertaken.
High risk	Harm is likely to arise to a receptor, and is likely to be severe, unless appropriate remedial actions / mitigation measures are undertaken.

	Remedial works may be required in the short term, but likely to be required over the long term.
Moderate risk	Possible that harm could arise to a receptor but low likelihood that such harm would be severe. Harm is likely to be medium. Some remedial works may be required in the long term.
Moderate / low risk	Possible that harm could arise to a receptor, but where a combination of likelihood and consequence results in a risk that is above low, but is not of sufficient concern to be classified as medium. It can be driven by cases where there is an acute risk which carries a severe consequence, but where the exposure is unlikely.
Low risk	Possible that harm could arise to a receptor. Such harm would at worse normally be mild.
Negligible risk	Low likelihood that harm could arise to a receptor. Such harm unlikely to be any worse than mild.

6. Accident and Incident Response

Accidents and incidents are managed in accordance with the Incident Management policy and procedures and Emergency Planning manual.

YW utilises the Nintex app to report, record, manage and assess incidents and accidents. This is available on phones and handheld devices of YW staff and provides an auditable record for every incident. Relevant forms used to record accidents are available electronically via this system.

In the event of a significant incident a root cause analysis is conducted. Actions are identified, reported, recorded, and communicated to prevent reoccurrence.

Complaints are typically received by YW central Customer Services team, where all complaints are logged on the ICE system. Complaints relevant to Esholt STF are passed on to the Site Manager for further investigation. The Site Manager is responsible for ensuring that any complaint is investigated and, if found to be justified, that work is undertaken to resolve the issue, including liaising with the relevant regulatory bodies where appropriate. The Customer Service Team ensure an appropriate response to the complainant in a timely manner including, if and as appropriate, detailing the reason behind the issue and the actions taken to resolve the matter.

All complaints information is recorded on the ICE system in order that this can be monitored, reviewed, and analysed.

If an incident with potentially significant environmental consequences occurs, YW will notify the Environment Agency without delay, and in accordance with the procedures and requirements specified in the site environmental permit.

7. Emergency contacts

Area	Contact
Esholt STF Contacts	Site Manager: Gavin Stowell
	Site Optimiser: Scott Jones
Bradford Council Environment Health	01274 432111
Environment Agency	03708 506 506

8. Definitions

Definitions of Terms Used:

Yorkshire Water	Yorkshire Water is used in this document to refer to Yorkshire Water Services Limited and all other subsidiary companies within Kelda Holdings.
Anaerobic Digestion	AD is used to refer to anaerobic digestion. The process which imported waste is subject to at this sewage treatment facility.
СНР	Combined Heat and Power

9. Compliance with this document

Colleagues shall comply with the requirements of this document, in line with the company Conduct Policy.

10. Assurance

Regular monitoring of compliance with these requirements shall be undertaken by the assurance providers documented as part of the Assurance Framework.

Any sampling that is undertaken will be taken in accordance with sampling procedures as documented in the internal guidance document Operator Self-Monitoring, which can be found on the Integrated Management System. Samples must be tested at a UKAS accredited laboratory.

11. Related Documents

N/A